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PREFACE 
This re search was conducted during the summer of 1971 in 
Charleston, Illinois. The Cl,)mions used to test the validity of the hy-
. pothesis were gathered from samples drawn from the faculty at Eastern 
Illinois University and from the elected county officials in Coles County. 
Briefly, this study sought to uncover the relationship between levels of 
education and specific foreign policy dispositions. Statistical methods 
facilitated the analysis of the large quantity of data. 
The demonstration that a given hypothesis may or may not be 
valid seems only a small part of the learning process associated with 
a study of this type. Interviewing, and later just talking with forty 
county officials was similar to concurrent seminars in local government, 
American public opinion, the sociology of small groups, and political 
behavior stripped of all euphemisms. Experiences with the faculty 
group both confirmed and denied previously held impressions. Of 
course, a myriad of such impressions was gained eventually. Some of 
them are reflected in the data and analysis. Many, because of their 
judgmental, intuitive, or non-quantifiable nature are not appropriate to 
this study. 
An appreciation and understanding of the complexities and prob-
ii 
lems of survey research and quantitative analysis is not the least of the 
realizations from this sort of study. The judgment, rigor, and atten-
tion to detail at each stage of the work determines the confidence with 
which the final results may be announced. 
This study directly involved over one hundred people including 
respondents, interviewers, faculty advisors, programmers, typists, 
and just friends who performed various chores from scoring to proof-
reading. Any researcher dealing with this many people is impressed 
with the near impossibility of coordinating their efforts and relying on 
their performances. At the same time, their ability to cooperate, adapt 
to the new and changing, and persist to the completion of a task is often 
uncanny. Little of this is especially new or unusual, but it is reward-
ing to experience. 
Charles R • Burns 
Eastern Illinois University 
1971 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Specific foreign policy issues change from year to year and from 
one administration to another. While the specific issues change, how-
ever, the general areas into which issues cluster remain the same. 
Despite the many differences between the Korean conflict and the war in 
VJet Nam, for instance, public debate on the two issues has been con-
cerned with the extent to which each issue reflects United States' inter-
ests, its willingness to become involved in foreign affairs, and the use 
of military force as an instrument of foreign policy implementation. 
In the course of the rise and decline of United States invovlement in 
Viet Nam, public debate on this immediate issue became particularly 
intense. 
In a representative democracy, public debate and its substantive 
content is especially important. Leaders and decision makers must 
understand the content, sources, and direction of public opinion. Elec-
ted officials may be voted out of office if they fail to understand the 
character .of the opinions which they attempt to lead, ch~nge, or shape. 
With this in mind, this study proposes to explain two specific 
l 
2 
attitudes and their sources. When operationalized, these attitudes are 
expressed as two distinct foreign affairs dispositions. The sources of 
the dispositions are the subject of the hypotheses and propositions ad-
vanced in this study. 
This research is an analysis of hypotheses and related proposi-
tions by means of the collection and quantitative analysis of survey data. 
The attention of this paper is confined to the role of demographic vari-
ables in determining dispositions toward foreign affairs. Although two 
elite groups are examined, they are distinctly "public" elites as opposed 
to policy or decision-making elites in foreign affairs. 
The two dispositions measured are nationalism-internationalism, 
and militarism-pacificism. The proposed determinants of the disposi-
tions include the level of information of a respondent and several demo-
graphic variables, the primary of which is level of education. The 
demographic information is obtained by asking direct questions, but the 
dispositions are assessed by means of indirect scales. The two groups 
are local intellectual and political elites, but in drawing a sample from 
.the elites, one assumes that the members of the sample possess attitu-
dinal, dispositiona 1, and demographic characteristics similar to the 
universe of elites of which they are a part. 
In doing political science re search, one might justifiably feel 
uncomfortable at the presentatio.n of a project which does not involve a 
direct analysis of power, so central is this concept to politics and polit-
3 
ical science. It is beyond the scope of .this work either to catalogue an 
extensive list of definitions of power or to develop and defend an orig-· 
inal definition. The extent to which this work is concerned with power 
is admittedly limited, and at that, only indirect. 1 
To some degree, however, power involves the influence of one 
actor or set of actors over another. The persistence and effectivene-ss 
of this influence is governed by many factors, not the least of which are 
the perceptions and attitudes of individuals and groups. At the receiving 
end, the more power an individual perceives another to have, the more 
likely; ·it is that the recipient will be influenced by the other •. Perception 
of actuality, which is molded by attitudinal and situational factors, may 
direct human behavior just as surely as what appears as actuality to the 
so-called "objective observer". Otto Klineberg has proposed that "If, . 
as there is good reason to believe ..• , the expectation· of war may in 
itself be a cause ·of war, the conviction that it is inevitable may have 
important practical consequences. 11 2 
Perception, in turn, is governed by a number of factors. Atti-
tudes, circumstances, and time all interact to increase the. likelihood of 
a particular perception. Chapter II is a selective consideration of the 
works of authors who have attempted to account for the factors which 
1See, for example, Harold D. Lasswell and Abi:aham Kaplan, 
Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950) for a 
theoretical discussion of political power • 
. 
20tto Klineberg, The Human Dimension In International Rela-
tions (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 9. 
4 
govern attitudes and political perceptions, as well as a review of the 
techniques they have employed to measure both the determinant factors 
and the re sultan~ perceptions. These studies are especially valuable 
for the methodological suggestions and for the hypotheses they provide. 
Chapter III develops · the major hypotheses examined in this work 
from the studies reviewed in Chapter II. Also, a number of related pro-
positions are advanced, The terminology of the hypothesis and_p.roposi-
tions is explained by means of both theoretical and operational defini-
tions. In addition, a number of other terms that frequently appear in 
this study a.re defined. The operational definitions, of course, are only 
·applicable to those concepts for which measuring instruments ar~ devel-
oped. An understanding of the operational definitions is especially im-
portant for accurate appraisal of the data analysis. 
Chapter IV provides the theoretical basis for this study. A num-
ber of concepts and their interrelationships are examined. At this level . 
of generalization, we approach what has been termed "middle-range" 
theory. 3 Higher levels of generalization are not appropriate to the hy-
pothesis being considered and not warranted by the scope of the study. 
Given hypotheses and evidence under consideration, more general theory 
would border on speculation. 
Chapter V is a detailed description of the test used to examine 
the validity of the hypotheses. In most ways, the methodology reflects 
3See David E. Easton, ed., Varieties of Political Theory (Engle-
wood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), for a discussion 
of the range of theories in polit~cal science. 
5 
standard procedure among the practitioners of quantitative analysis and 
survey technique in political science. The purpose in using quantative 
methods, aside from enabling the researcher to manage large amounts 
of information effectively, should be to permit the analysis and simpli-
fication of results and the development of conclusions. Because their 
use is intended to inform rather than confuse, similar scales and statis-
tics are employed throughout the test. Hppefully, this lends consistency 
that aids in the interpretation of results. Because a large measure of 
the effort involved in this study was directed at the design and adminis-
tration of the test, it represents a.major· section of the work. Appendix 
A includes samples of the testing materials described in this chapter. 
Chapter VI analyzes the results of the tests in view of the hypothe-
sis and propositions advanced in Chapter III. The analysis is ~elective 
in that the variables in the hypotheses are examined most carefully, 
along with variables that were not expected to yield significant relation-· 
ships. Additional variables which are neither directly related to a hy-
pothesis, nor result in unexpected relationships are treated only briefly.· 
The results are analyzed according to each independent variable, both 
groups being considered. The analysis of the variables is preceded by 
a general description of each group and the characteristics of the aggre-
gate (the results of combining the two groups). Supplementary tables 
and information regarding the data are included in Appendix B. 
Chapter VII presents the major conclusions drawn from the data 
analysis, and relate,s these conclusions to the hypothesis an9 propositions. 
41 
6 
Of course, the conclusions are definitive only within the limits of the 
accuracy of the test and the validity of the theoretical framework. 
Throughout this study there is a consistent effort to be conservative 
where there is a likelihood of error. Therefore, relationships that are 
not clearly substantiated are presented as suggestions for further re-
search rather than as conclusions. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This review of literature is intended to be selective and sugge s-
tive of the significant works available, but not exhaustive. The books 
and articles mentioned below were chosen either because they illustrate 
the use of survey techniques and quantitative analysis or because they 
offer interesting propositions that may be developed into hypotheses. 
Most of them will be referred to again during the analysis of the data, 
but for now it is necessary to describe their contributions to research 
in the subject area; they provide a context of background and perspective 
in which to set the analysis and conclusions of this study. 
Gamson, Lane, and Sears all examine the extent to which edu-
cation or knowledge governs foreign policy opinions. 4 Gamsori, for 
example, argues that increases in the level of knowledge do not neces-
s~rily produce greater opinion consensus on foreign policy issues. 
Basing his discussion on attitude surveys, he finds that the two main 
4William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani, "Knowledge and 
Foreign Policy Opinions, 11 Public Opinion Quarterly, (Sµmmer, 1966), 
187-2.00; Robert E. Lane and David O. Sears, Public Opinion (Engle-
wood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964). 
7 
8 
determinants of foreign policy opinions are: (1) pre-existing individual 
attitudes; (2) prevalent or "mainstream" policy attitudes. 
Gamson uses a "cognitive-consistency" model to evaluate public 
opinion formation and knowledge. The model employs three arbitrary 
belief systems and tests the frequency with which respondents change 
belief systems over a number of issues. Findings indicate that increases 
in knowledge at least provide £or more consistent belief patterns although 
it does not determine the specific belief structure. 
Lane and Sears examine a slightly different dimension of foreign 
policy opinion. They review the results of a study which found that edu-
cation, in particular college education, was not a significant variable 
in the demonstration of a high level of political information. They turn 
to other influences such as family environment for the key determinants 
of level of information. 
Significantly, Lane and Sears maintain that circumstance and 
immediate situation may to a large extent govern both level of informa-
tion and the nature of an individual's opinion. This is based on the pre-
mise that people may carefully select only the information necessary to 
their functioning in a given situation. Extreme cases of this are obvi-
ous. The Fore.ign Service officer is more likely to be informed on inter~. 
national affairs than the metal worker. More subtle differences in situ-
ation, however, demand testing to establish the validity of the premise. 
Rogers compared the foreign policy opinions of groups to their 
9 
level of information about the issue. The study not only found disagree-
ment among the foreign policy views of the general public, but also among 
· the "experts". His evidence suggests that higher levels of information 
· do not necessarily produce greater consensus on foreign policy issues. 5 
A study by R eiselbach finds moderate correlations between the 
traditional determinants of isolationist behavior and isolationism. The 
traditional determinants are: rural-midwest; Republic'an-conservative; 
and ethnic perspective. Because his study uses Congressional voting 
records, Reiselbach encounters a major methodological problem. Party 
loyalty and pressure group activity may tend to influence voting on fore-
ign policy issues as much as isolationist beliefs. Demography and issue 
salience are eventually judged to be the primary determinants of isola-
tionist behavior. 6 
McClosky devotes approximately half of his book to a discussion 
of the merits, methodology, and techniques of survey research. The 
remainder of the work is a detailed study of "Personality and Attitude 
Corre late s of Foreign Policy Orientation". This is an attempt to ". • • 
explore on various fronts the utility of psychological constructs for ex-
plaining political beliefs, orientation, and activity. f, 7 
5William C. Rogers, Barbara Stubler, and David A. Koenig, "A 
Comparison of Informed and General Public Opinion On U .s. Foreign 
Policy, 11 Public Opinion Quarterly, 11 (Summer, 1967), .2.42.-2.53. 
6Leroy N. Reiselbach, •iThe Basis of Isolationist Behavior, 11 
Public Opinion Quarterl:x:, rv (Winter, 1960), 645-653. 
7He.rbert McClosky, Political Inquiry (London: Macmillan Com-
pany~ 1969), p. 71. 
10 
The rnain conceptual suggestion McClosky makes, for the purposes 
of this study, is that beliefs may be scaled along an isolationist-nonisola-
tionism continuwn. He further divides these beliefs into aggressive-
nonaggressive, enabling a researcher to evaluate explicit beliefs on an 
axis that might be graphically expressed as below: 
Isolationist 
IV 
Figure 1 
Attitudinal Axis 
Aggressive 
Nonaggressive 
II 
Nonisolationist 
III 
Although McClosky does not use this axis, it seems a fair repre-
sentation of his conceptual framework, as well as a useful means of 
arranging aggregate data for analysis of group belief systems. 
Because McClosky' s study concentrates on the possible psycho-
iogical determinants of foreign policy orientations, hi"s treatment of the 
dependent variables mentioned above is rriore valuable than his analysis 
. . . 
of independent variables. 
11 
Scott's approach is similar to McClosky1 s in the emphasis of 
the importance of psychological constructs in the explanation of an indi-
vidual's behavior toward international relations. Basically, his hypoth-
esis is that people tend to advocate relations among nations' which cor-
respond structurally with their notions of ideal relations among people. 
This emphasizes the impact of nonpolitical, or more general social val-
ues on foreign policy opinions. 8 
In his section on the nature of American public opinion and fore-
ign policy, Charles O. Lerche proposes four major characteristic short-
comings of American public opinion: ( 1) the general lack of information 
possessed by American on foreign policy issues; (Z) the tendency of 
Americans to be impatient about international affairs; (3) the highly 
emotional character of American public opinion; (4) the preference for 
- dichotomies manifested by Americans. These four characteristics, 
which are supported by survey data, are important considerations for 
this study. They figured significantly in the design of the questionnaire 
and are important limitations on some of the conclusions. 9 
In his analysis of political behavior and the determinants of polit-
ical behavior, Bowen proceeds on an assumption advanced by many stu.;:; 
dents in this area: 
8William A. Scott, "International Ideology and Interpersonal 
Ideology, 11 Public Opinion Quarterly, III (Fall, 1960), 419-436. 
9charles O. Lerche, Foreign Polic~ of the American Peo~le 
(3rd ed.: Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:rentice-Hall, Inc., 1 67), 
pp. 155-156. 
12 
••• the amount and kind of information that an 
individual possesses concerning politics is likely 
to be a direct reflection of his group associations 
at all levels of education and status. 10 
The implication of this assumption for the study of foreign policy 
opinion is that a particular group membership is likely to affect the sub-
stantive nature of an opinion. Level of information and group member-
ship, then, are interrelated variables in the determination of an opinion. 
Two central propositions advanced by Gabriel Almond provide 
direction for the formulation and examination of a hypothesis. The first 
contains Almond's basic judgment on the nature of public attitudes and 
opinions on foreign policy: 
Attitudes and opinions on foreign policy are not only . 
to be understood as responses to objective problem's 
and situations, but as conditioned by culturally im-
posed qualities of character. These largely uncon-
scious patterns of reactions and behavior strongly 
influence the perception, selection, and evaluation 
of political reality. 11 
The above suggests that there are a _number of indirect and sub-
tle influences that shape public opinion on foreign policy issues. If the 
influences are culturaUy based, as Almond suggests, they might include 
social-economic status, level of education, and opportunities to partici-
pate in democratic processes. Variations among groups with respect to 
· these determinants, therefore, would produce subsequent aggregate 
lODon R. Bowen, Political Behavior of the American Public 
(Columbus Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1968), p. 48. 
1 lGabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1960), p. Z.9. 
13 
differences in foreign policy attitudes. 
More specifically, Almond proposes that "The will to participate 
in world affairs is an intellectual and learned attitude validated by imme·.;; 
diate experience and moral pressure." lZ If this is the case, there will 
. be differences in the foreign policy attitudes of the following groups of 
persons: (1) persons of varying levels of education; (Z) persons who 
have had varying amounts of exposure to the social science ·disciplines: 
(3) persons who have varying amounts of moral pressure to hold foreign 
policy opinions. This moral pressure might come from peer groups, 
organizational membership, or occupational demands. This proposition 
and _its implications provide the basis for the development of the hypoth-
esis which this study investigates. 
These studies represent the central body of knowledge· from which 
this study proceeds. The techniques employed are most similar to 
McClosky' s. The hypothesis and related propositions are generated 
primarily by Almond's work. A 11 of the studies suggest areas of inves-
tigation and familiarize the researcher with some of the problems he is 
. . 
likely to ~ncounter in doing a public opinion study of foreign· affairs dis-
positions. 
lZ A.lmond, Op. Cit., p. 76. 
CHAPTER III 
HYPOTHESES AND DEFINITIONS 
Introduction 
This study is essentially a test of the propositions derived from 
the body of knowledge reviewed in Chapter II. Definitions of terms in 
this chapter are listed immediately below the hypotheses and. proposi-
tions in which they fir st occur. The definitions are of two types: ( 1) 
Theoretical, i:q. which the concepts are defined " ••• in terms of other 
concepts which are supposedly already under stood." 13 (2) Operational 
definitions, which delineate the actual procedure used by this study to 
measure the concept. 'Io the extent that the theoretical and operational 
definitions are coincident and consistent in actual fact, the validity of 
the concepts, and ultimately the validity of the hypotheses is tested. 
Ideally, each concept in a testable hypothesis should be operationally 
defined. 14 Some of the definitions in this chapter refer to concepts 
13Hubert M. Blalock, Social Statistics (New York: McGray-
Hill B~ok Company, 1960), p. 9. 
14Ibid., p. 11. 
14 
15 
that are not used in the hypotheses, but are used frequently in this study. 
~ypothesis I 
Consideration of Almond's work leads to the conclusion that: 15 
As an individual's level of education increases, he tends to be 
more internationalist than nationalist in his attitude toward world affairs. 
If this hypothesis is valid, then this proposition will be supported 
by the study: 
Those individuals characterized by high levels of education are 
more likely to be internationalist, and those characterized by low levels 
are more likely to be nationalist. 
Three groupings of individuals are examined in this study. The 
two basic groups are the faculty and the county officials. The validity 
of the hypotheses is tested when all respondents are members of one of 
these two groups. The third group is called the "aggregate". In the 
aggregate, the validity of the hypotheses is tested when au respondents 
are combined for analysis without regard to their membership in the· 
first two groups. 
Level of Education is measured in terms ofthe amount of formal 
e'ducation reported by the respondent. Six categories are used ranging 
from 0-8. years to graduate s.chool study at the Ph~ D. level. In the ag-
gregate, and for the county officials, respondents are assigned to the 
15Almond, Op •. Cit., pp. 139-157. 
16 
high level of education category if they have completed some college 
work or above. The low level of education category includes individuals 
with no college experience. The faculty group are considered of high 
level of education if they have completed graduate work at the M.A. or 
PH.D. levels; low, if they have a B.A. or B.s. 16 
Nationalists are individuals whose political concerns and priorities. 
are primarily focused on the issues and interests of their own county. 
They tend to be much less concerned with the situation of the international 
community than with the well-being and advantage of their nation. Inter-
nationalists, on the other hand, are less concerned with national pride, 
independence, and territorial integrity than harmony among nations, 
cultural exchange, and active involvement in international affairs. 17 
In the aggregate, respondents scoring on or above the mean score 
of the aggregate on Levinson' s "Nationalism-Internationalism" scale 
are considered nationalists. IS All persons scoring below the aggregate 
mean are classified internationalists. Likewise, members of both elite 
groups are categorized as either nationalists or internationalists depend-
16oemographic characteristics include party affiliation and level 
of education as. well as the "hard" facts such as age, sex, and marital 
status. Some studies exclude the former, but for the sake of simplicity, 
this study considers them all as demographic variables. 
17McClosky, Op. Cit., p. 77. 
180. J. Levinson, "Authoritarian Personality a~d Foreign Pol-
icy," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, I (March, 1957), pp. 37-47. 
17 
ing upon whether they score above or below the mean score of their re-
spective group. To this extent, nationalism-internationalism is a rela-
tive attitude. Respondents are compared to other individuals in the group. 
It should also be noted that the nationalist-internationalist division in this 
study is somewhat artificial. The use of the mean score as a dividing 
line is arbitrary, but consistent. The categories are labeled "nationalist" 
and "internationalist", but should be more accurately understood as 
m·eaning "more nationalist" and "more internationalist". 
Both nationalists and internationalists may be further character-
ized by their militarist-pacifist tendencies. This dimension is included · 
to clarify nationalism-internationalism. No hypothesis regarding mili-
tarist-pacifist attitudes is advanced when this dimension is analyzed. 
· The ·fundamental proposition about this attitude is that it is independent 
of nationalism-internationalism attitude changes.19 Respondents are 
more militarist if they score below the mean for their group on Droba' s 
"Militarism-Pacificism" scale. ZO Similarly, if they score on or above 
' . . 
the mean, they are classified as more pacifist. 
Hypothesis II 
Drawing on the work of Almond and Lane and Sears, it is possible 
l9McClosky, Op. Cit., p. 73. 
20n. D. Droba, "A Scale To Measure Militarism-Pacificism, 11 
Journal of Educational Psychology, XXII (January, 1931), pp. 96-111. 
---~----
18 
to conclude:Z 1 
The more education an individual has completed, the more in-
formed he will tend to be about international affairs. 
This study therefore· expects to validate the following proposition: : 
Individuals characterized by high levels of educa~ion are more 
likely to exhibit high levels of information about foreign affairs than 
individuals of low levels of education. 
Hypothesis III 
Lane and Sears propose that an individual's level of information 
will, in itself, affect his attitude structure. 2.2.· Under these conditions, 
a pers~m' s opinion is a direct reflection of the amount of information 
he has gathered. This would indicate that: 
An individual's specific disposition toward foreign affairs will 
·be dependent on the amount of information he possesses about foreign 
affairs. 
From this, and the pre<:eding propositions, it is possible to con-
clude that: 
Illa. · Higli information individuals are more likely to be internationalist 
than low information individuals. 
IIIb. Low information individuals are more likely to be nationalist than 
2.1. 6 Almond, 22_. Cit.,. p. 7 • 
2.2.Lane and Sear-s, Op. 9_!!., p. 13. 
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high information individuals. 
At· this stage, two alternative causal models are evident. Sym-
bolically, they may be expressed as below: 
Figure 2 
Models of Causal Linkage 
X -
,f, 1 -------~.... y ~ :;,, 
Xz -
Model I 
Model II 
Where: x1 • level of education 
X z = level of information 
Y • nationalism-internationalism attitude 
· In the first model, education and level of information interact to 
produce a specific attitude. Each is partially responsible for an indi-
vidual's eventual disposition. The second model indicates a linear flow 
of causation where education determines level of information, and level 
of information determines the eventual attitude. A third possibility, 
which involves the rejection of Hypothesis III, would show that education 
determines attitudes directly. In this case, .level of inf9rmation would 
be irrelevant. 
In this study, a ~cale drawing on television news broadcasts and, 
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newspapers is used to evaluate an individual's level of information. 
Respondents scoring on or above the mean score of their group are under-
stood to exhibit high levels of information. Respondents scoring below 
the mean exhibit low levels of information about foreign affairs. 
!:!re'Othe sis IV 
In order to examine the impact of different types of education on 
foreign affairs dispositions, respondents were asked how many social 
science courses they had completed. On the basis of the following hy-
pothesis, an individual's exposure to the social sciences is tested for 
a possible relationship to his attitudes: 
Among individuals with college experience, those with back-
grounds in the social sciences will have significantly different attitudes 
than those with little or no social science background. 
For the purposes of this study, two propositions are offered: 
IVa. Individuals with high levels of social science background are more 
likely to be internationalist, and those with low levels of social science 
background are more likely to be nationalist in their foreign affairs dis-
position. 
IVb. Individuals with high levels of social science background are more 
likely to exhibit high levels of information, and those with low levels of 
social science background are more likely to exhibit low levels of infor-
mation about foreign affairs. 
Zl 
College social sciences include: political science, history, soci-
ology, economics, and anthropology. Respondents who reported having 
studied a number of courses that is on or above the mean number for 
their group are characterized by high levels of background. Those below 
the mean are considered low .level background individuals. 
Hypothesis V 
The degree to which an individual's curiosity and interest in 
foreign affairs influence his attitudes and level of information is largely 
unexplored, One reason for the lack of research in this area is the 
problem of obtaining accurate: self-evaluations, To examine this area, 
the following hypothesis is advanced: 
Individuals who are interested in foreign affairs will have sig-
nificantly different amounts of information and different attitudes from 
those who are not interested. 
This hypothesis results in two propositions: 
Va. Higher levels of interest will be accompanied by higher levels 
of information among ind ivid ua ls. 
Vb. Individuals with high levels of interest are more likely to be 
internationalist, and those with low levels of interest are more likely 
to be nationalist in their foreign affairs disposition. 
Two indicators measure level of interest in this study: (I) Self-
evaluation, in which the respondent is directly asked if he is interested 
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in foreign affairs. Responses of "very interested" or "moderately in-
terested" ar~ placed in the high level of interest category. Responses 
of "interested, but not informed" or "not at all interested" are low levels 
of interest. (2) Indirect self-evaluation, in which individuals are asked 
to what extent they use radio or television newsbroadcasts or newspapers 
to keep informed. They either indicated that they did use the media 
regularly or that they did not_ use them regularly. 
Hypothesis VI 
Gabriel Almond implies that an individual's foreign affairs dis-
position is partially determined by his ". ~ . immediate experience and 
moral pressure. 11 23 To the extent that elite group membership is a 
type of immediate experience which generates a certain moral pressure 
and demands on its members, the following hypothesis is offered: 
Members of respective elite groups will be characterized by 
different levels of information and attitudes. 
With the preceding propositions and the generally higher level 
of education among the faculty group in mind, the following propositions 
are expected to be valid: 
Via. Members of intellectual elites are more likely to exhibit high 
levels of information about foreign affairs than members of political 
elites. 
23 Almond, Op. Cit., p. 76. 
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Vlb. Members of intellectual elites are more likely to be internation-
alist, and members of political elites are more likely to be nationalist 
in their foreign affairs disposition. 
Elite groups are characterized by high levels of homogeneity, 
social cohesiveness, and awareness among the membership of their 
inclusion in the group. Individuals in an elite group share certain com-
mon sets of values that are considered socially scarce and worthy of 
esteem from other members of society. These values may be used to 
characterize the nature of the specific elite under consideration~ This 
study deals with elites that are opinion-holders rather than decision-
makers as far as foreign policy is concerned. 
The focus is on two elites in this study: ( I) The intellectual elite, 
which is characterized by consistently high levels of education, involve-
ment in scholarship, teaching, and related activities. A sample of fac-
ulty members at Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, Illinois, repre-
sents this elite. (Z) The political elite which is characterized by rela-
tively high levels of political activity and influence on public affairs. 
Often, members of the political elite occupy formal, elected political 
office. A sample of elected county officials in Coles County, Illinois, 
represents the political elite. 
Hypothesis VII 
If elite group membership constitutes a moral pressure which 
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influences the attitudes of the individual, membership in other groups 
will also influence attitudes to a certain extent. From this assumption, 
the following conclusion is drawn: 
The number of voluntary organizations to which an individual 
belongs will influence the amount of information he possesses and his 
attitudes. 
Two specific propositions devolve from this hypothesis: 
Vlla. Persons indicating high levels of membership in voluntary organi-
zations are more likely to exhibit high levels of information, and those 
with low levels of membership are more likely to exhibit low levels of 
information. 
Vllb. Persons indicating high levels of organizational membership are 
n:iore likely to be internationalists, and those with low levels of organi-
zation membership are more likely to be nationalist in their foreign 
affairs disposition. 
Respondents indicating membership in a number of voluntary 
organizations on or above the mean are placed in the high level category. 
Those who belong to a number below the mean are low level respondents. 
Voluntary organizations include civic, fraternal, or professional groups 
or clubs. 
In the preceding propositions, the phrase "more likely" denotes 
a relationship between the two variables which equals or exceeds one of 
the three orders of significance established at the end of Chapter V. 
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The validation of a proposition does not prove the existence of 
. a cause and effect relationship between the two variables. At the moat, 
it indicates some degree of covariance between them. At the same time, 
however, there are causal implications in this study. To some extent, 
the independent variables, level of education, elite group membership, 
and so on, are understood to be causal factors of the dependent variable. 
At a higher level of generalization and a higher order of sophistication, 
the demographic variables are at least partially causal to the disposi-
tional variables. The following is a symbolic expression of the causal 
form of the hypotheses in this chapter. 
Key: i . 
t· 
Figure 3 
Causal Form of Hypotheses I-VII 
An increase in 
A decrease in ••• 
. ~ • Causes 
X1 ... 7 • The independent variable including education, level of 
information, social science background, elite group 
membership., and voluntary organizati.on membership, 
or all of the demographic variables. 
• The dependent variables, nationalism-internationalism, 
level of information, essentially the dispositional or 
attitudinal variables. 
26 
As noted above, the precise causal interrelationships among the inde:-
pendent variables and their subsequent relationship to the dependent 
variables remain to be determined. 
Essentially, this chapter is the operational transformation of 
Almond's !:\tatement, "The will to participate in world affairs" into a 
relative score on the nationalism-internationalism scale; whether it is 
" ••. an intellectual and learned attitude .•• 11 is measured by level of 
formal education, social science background,· interest, and level of in-
formation; whether it is 11 ••• validated by. immediate experience and 
moral pressure" is indicated by elite group membership, membership 
in voluntary organizations, and, to some degree, level of information. 24 
The relationships among these indicators is made explicit by the 
formulation of the propositions. Seven related hypotheses are advanced 
because the validation of one or more of the propositions may indicate 
relationships of a higher order of generalization. 
24Ibid •. 
CHAPTER IV 
THEOR ET ICA L ORIENT AT ION 
A central problem of theoretical concern is conceptualization 
and the interrelation of concepts. This chapter is a discussion of major 
concepts which are basic. to this study. The discussion is not intended 
to develop an exhaustive middle range theory of the role of political 
attitudes. More simply, it is a consideration of more r,.arrow theoreti-
cal scope especially pertinent to the focus of this study. 
From various sources, Shaw and Wright distill a definition of 
the concept of attitude: 
A relatively enduring system of evaluative, affective 
reactions based upon and reflecting the evalui;ttive con-
cepts or beliefs which have been learned about the 
characteristics of a social object or.class of social 
objects. 2 5 
More specifically, an attitude is " ..• an affective component which 
is based upon cognitive proc~sses and is an antecedent of behavior. 112 6 
From this definition, the significance of attitudes is quite apparent. 
25Marvin E. Shaw and Jack M. Wright, Scales For The Measure-
ment of Attitudes (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967), p. 3. 
2 61bid. , pp. 2. - 3. 
2. 7 
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Political attitudes, for instance, immediately precede and direct politi-
. cal behavior. In one sense they are similar to political motives in that 
they provide direction for the resulting behavior. Unlike motives, how-
ever, attitudes are neither drive-producing or necessarily goal- specific. Z 7 
Attitudes are the sum of beliefs about an object and the 11 ••• evalu-
ation of the preferability of the characteristics or existence of the ob-
ject. 112 8 In the context of the previously advanced definition, attitudes 
are also value-related. The affective expression of the worth or value 
of an oJ>ject is an important component of attitudes. 
Shaw and Wright examine several characteristics of attitudes 
that are implicit in the foregoing discussion. 
1. Attitudes are directly related to overt, motivated behavior. To 
the extent that they precede and direct behavior, knowledge of a 
specific attitude holds certain clues to eventual behavior. 
2. Attitudes are understood to vary along a continuum in both inten-
sity and quality. The continuum runs for strong preference through 
neutrality to strong aversion for the social object. This poses a 
serious operational problem. If attitudes actually vary along a 
continuum, any demarcation of the continuum is likely to be a 
distorted reflection of the attitude. 
3. Attitudes are learned and cognitive rather than inherent, genetic, 
27Shaw and Wright, Qe_. Cit., p. 5. 
28Ibid., p. 4. 
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or the result of biological or instinctual processes. Attitudes 
have the same charactistics common to all learning in that they 
may be reinforced, maintained, or altered. 
4. Attitudes refer to specific social objects or sets of social objects. 
They may be more or less complex or specific depending upon 
the complexity or specificity of the referent object and the degree 
of individual elaboration of the attitude. The extent to which the 
attitude is well-developed and consistent with other attitudes seems 
to depend upon the relevance of a particular social object to the 
individual. 
5. Attitudes are more or less interrelated. Central attitudes about 
relevant social objects tend to be more closely and logically inter-
related than peripheral attitudes. Because they are interrelated, 
attitudes are resistant to change. Frequent alteration of central 
attitudes involves alteration of many related peripheral attitudes. 
Interrelatedness, therefore, demands some amount of stability. 
Frequent changing of an individual's highly complex attitudinal 
structure would result in constant confusion at the very least. 29 
Opinions are the expression of attitudes. A specific opinion may 
be the result of the influence and interrelatedness of several attitudes. 
Often, opinions are more specific than attitudes. For example, an in-
dividual has an attitude toward war which influences his opinion about 
Z9shaw and Wright, Op. Cit., pp. 6-10. 
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a specific war. The most common form of attitude-expres,sion or 
opinion-holding is verbal. Although actions express attitudes, they are 
more precisely overt behavior, In a peripheral sense, of course, 
opinion-holding is a form of human behavior. 
Various factors may influence the learning, maintainance, or 
alteration of attitudes. Political attitudes should be understood to be 
similar to other sets of attitudes with respect to their development. 
Social circumstance, formal education, peer group associations, and 
the relevance of politics as a social object all contribute to the develop-
ment of a particular political attitude. In turn, the attitude directly 
influences political behavior. The .researcher's access to the nature 
of the attitude is through the individual's opinion. Clearly, opinion and 
overt behavior, voting, protest activity, and campaigning, for instance, 
are not always in perfect coincidence. To the degree that they coincide, 
however, knowledge of an individual's opinion may be of value in pre-
dicting his behavior. Information about the present political opinions 
of an individual may provide clues to his behavior in the future because 
opinions reflect attitudes, which are relatively stable and enduring. 
It has been proposed that attitudes are learned and subject to 
change. They .are learned from specific sets of social experiences. 
Some of these experiences have a stronger impact on the development 
of specific attitudes than others.. Knowledge of which experiences tend 
to produce particular attitudes is of predictive value. This study finds 
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that level of education is positively related to internationalist tenden-
cies. Militarist or pacificist tendencies, on the other hand are not re-
lated to level of education. Within the limitations of this study' s find-
ings, an observer noting an overall increase in a nation's level of edu-
cation would predict a general shift toward internationalism, but no 
necessary change in militarism-pacificism attitudes. 
Within this theoretical framework, a change in attitudes entails 
a necessary change in behavior. Nationalist-internationalist and 
militarist-pacifist opinions are examined in this study. One underlying 
assumption is that these· opinions reflect similar attitudes which, in 
turn, direct appropriate behavior. Resultant behavior patterns are be-. 
yond the scope of this study. By way of a brief example, however, na-
tionalist behavior would include a willingness to more readily accept 
nationalist-oriented foreign policies. Militarist behavior might include 
a readiness to support the rise of military force in the resolution of 
international conflict. 
Various social experiences not only determine the specific na-
ture of political attitudes, but also determine whether or not specific 
political attitudes are central or peripheral. Political referent objects 
which are more relevant to an individual are more likely to be central 
in his attitudinal structure. Central attitudes are more likely to be 
complex, interrelated, and logically consistent than peripheral attitudes. 
An individual actively collects and experiences more information about 
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referent objects that are important to him, Increased amounts of infor-
mation allow for more elaborately developed and consistent attitudes. 
To some degree this creates attitudinal stability because existing pre-
dispositions will sort the information and experiences the individual 
receives. 
Theoretically, demographic variables describe the individual's 
life experiences and situation and a particular point in time, Operation-
ally, selected demographic variables are expressed quantitatively to 
measure their impact on attitudes and behavior. Unfortunately, these 
operations are often applied to the demographic variables which are 
easily qua:ntified rather than those that may appear most theoretically· 
significant. 
McClosky' s study of the "Personality and Attitude Correlates 
of Foreign Policy Orientation" is somewhat of an effort to circumvent 
this operational problem, 30 If apparently significant theoretical vari-
ables could not be measured directly, their most immediate effects, 
their psychological results that is, might be accurately measured. Ob-
viously, the impact of variables such as child-rearing practices, emo-
tional trauma, and personal success or failure might be more accurately 
determined through indirect measurement of their psychological effects 
at the current stage of scientific development. 
This study does not take exception to the possible theoretical sig-
3?McClosky, .2E_: Cit, 
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nificance of these initial and highly personal variables or McClosky's 
measurement techniques. A major contention of this study, however, 
is that there are a number of relatively easily accessible and measur-
able variables which have significant influence on the development of 
political attitudes. These variables are susceptible to change, and 
will significantly alter the attitudes of the individuals they effect. Their 
effects on a wide range of political attitudes have been tested by previ-
ous researchers. An extensive, systematic analysis of the impact of 
demographic variables on nationalist-internationalist attitudes, and 
foreign affairs disposition in general, however, has been largely ignored. 
The theoretical significance of this study, therefore, rests on an examin-
ation of the possible validity .and· relevance of some of these variables 
to a specific attitude. 
CHAPTER V 
DESCRIPTION OF THE TEST 
The selection of the survey technique as a means of gathering 
data to test the validity of the hypothesis and propositions dictated the 
design of a questionnaire. Four criteria were considered important 
limitations on the design and construction of the questionnaire: ( 1) The 
form of the questionnaire had to reduce as much as possible the cost of 
its construction and administration. With this in mind, an answer sheet 
separate from the questionnaire was used to record responses, elim-
inating the necessity of reproducing the five page questionnaire some 
eighty times. Also, the use of the answer sheet allowed. for extensive 
pre-coding of responses and the use of a relatively simple scoring key 
and post-coding procedure, thereby reducing the amount of time needed 
to transform unprocessed information into data compatible with exist-
ing computer programs. The additional time required ~o pre-code and 
design the questionnaire was more than compensated for by the time 
saving realized when encoding the data for computer input. 
(2) Accuracy in the .measurement of both the opinions and the 
demographic factors was perhaps the most difficult of the criteria to 
34 
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meet. The internationalism-nationalism scale and the militarism-
pacifism scale had both been previously tested by researchers. 31 The 
selection of these two particular tests rather than the many others avail-
able was governed by a judgment of their appropriateness to the hypoth-
e~is being tested. Secondly, the tests were evaluated by an examination 
of their reliability in "Split-half", "Test-Retest", and validity corre-
lates establish~d by previous researchers. 3Z 
The level of information test was developed by the author with 
the guidance of academic personnel at Eastern Illinois University, and 
the extensive use of survey research literature. 33 Special attention 
· was given to covering a wide range of foreign affairs issue areas. The 
final forms of the demographic questions were tested for clarity, pre-
cision, and the degree to which they consistently elicited the de sired 
information. Specific limitations regarding the accuracy of each ~ection 
31 · See Droba, Op. Cit., and Levinson, Op. Cit. 
32see Shaw, Op. Cit., pp. 16-21. In the "Test-Retest Method .•• 
The attitude scale is administered to the same group of persons at two 
different times, and the correlation between the two sets of scores is 
computed." (p. 16) The "Split-half Method, .. estimates reliability by 
treating each of two or more parts of the attitude scale as a separate 
scale, .. the reliability estimate is the correlation between the scores 
of the separate scales." (p. 17), 
3 31 relied on Charles H. Backstrom and Gerald W. Hursh, Sur-
~~esearch (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1963) for phras-
ing the questions and statement sequence. The content of the questions 
was taken from metropolitan newspapers in consultation with Dr. John R, 
Faust, Professor of Political Science, Eastern Illinois University. Re-
finement of the scale after the pre-test was done with the assistance of 
Dr. Thomas E. Scism,· Professor of Political Science, Eastern Illinois 
University. 
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of the questionnaire are discussed more fully in Chapter VI. 
(3) The questionnaire is as comprehensive as possible given the 
restrictions of cost and the desire for brevity. If the null hypothesis 
were supported, it seemed desirable to be able to explain its support 
in terms of as many variables as possible. For this reason, a good 
deal of information other than level of education was obtained. 
The Militarism-Pacificism test was included in order to add 
another dimension to the Internationalism-Nationalism measurement. 
This test would ho_pefully give more precision to the evaluation of the 
questionnaire in general. 
(4) The pressures supporting brevity were compelling: the use 
of volunteer, relatively inexperienced, personnel for administration, 
the size of the project, the time available for completion, and the cave-
ats of Messrs. Backstrom and Hursh argued for severe restrictions. 34 
Initial tests by inexperienced interviewers required between thirty and 
forty minutes per respondent. Experienced interviewers eventually 
gathered data at an average rate of fifteen to twenty minutes per respond- , 
ent. 
In its final form the questionnaire has four major sections pre-
faced by "Instructions To The Interviewers". 35 The first section, which 
includes twelve questions, constitutes the internationalism-nationalism 
34Backstrom and Hursh, Op. Cit., pp. 60, 69-70, llZ-13, 130. 
· 
35See Appendix A for the complete questionnaire in its final form. 
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scale (IN). The scale was developed by Levinson in 1957. 36 It is a 
Likert-type scale with a range of scores from 10-70. The starred items 
on the questionnaire included in the appendix are statements expressing 
an internationalist position; the others express a nationalist position. 
{The items were not starred on the questionnaires used for actual inter-
views~) 
Respondents were allowed six degrees of agreement or disagree-
ment ranging from strong support to strong opposition. Provision was 
made for no response. Each item is given a score ranging from 1-7; 
+3 is equivalent to 1; -3 is equivalent to 7. For starred items, the scor-· 
fag is reversed; +3 is then equivalent to 7; -3 is equivalent to 1. The 
mean of the total items scores is multiplied by ten; the higher the result-
ing scores, the stronger the nationalist position. 
As it was administered by Levinson, the test yielded a mean of 
31. 8, a standard deviation of lZ. 5, and a range of 10-64. The eighty-
four subjects were a rather highly diversified group of students at Har- . 
vard University. 37 Levinson' s findings correspond roughly with .the 
results discussed in Chapter VI of this study. 
Three significant modifications were made on the original scale .•. 
The first statement originally read: "We need more leaders like MacAithui-, 
who have the morals and strength to put national honor above appease-
36Levinson, Op. Cit., pp. 37-47. 
37 
. Ibid., p. 41. 
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ment. "38 MacArthur's name was deleted from the final version because 
its inclusion seems less significant now than in 1957 when the scale was 
developed. The strong nationalist sentiment, and even some military 
overtone seemed to remain after the deletion. Some of the confusion 
expressed by pre-test respondents was eliminated. In its final form, 
the statement reads: "We need more leaders who have the morals and 
strength to put national honor above appeasement." 
The sixth statement originally read: "Our best policy in China 
would be to forget about Chiang-Kai-shek, and to work for a coalition 
between the Communists and the 'center' parties. 11 39 This statement 
is also oriented toward an issue that is somewhat dated. In an attempt 
to preserve the internationalist sentiment of the statement and update 
its issue content, it was changed to read: "Our best policy in Viet Nam 
would be to forget about the Saigon government, and work for an agree-
ment with the Communists." 
The third significant modification is that the test was adminis-
tered orally to respondents in this survey. The original tests were 
taken silently by the respondents. In order to minimize the effects of 
this difference, respondents were given a card with the choices of agree .. 
m ent and disagreement printed in the same form as on the original test. 
Interviewers were allowed to repeat a statement twice if requested to . 
38Levinson, Op. Cit., p. 41. 
39Ibid., 
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by the respondent, but were not allowed to return to a statement if they 
had proceded to a subsequent statement. The interviewers were not 
allowed to change a response once they had recorded a response and 
read a subsequent statement. 
The second major section consists of a twelve-item militarism-
pacifism scale (MP). It is an equal-appearing interval scale developed 
by Droba in 1931. 4o Even though it is some forty years old, the highly 
general nature of the statements would seem to insulate it from changing 
issues. 
Each item is assigned an equivalent number, depending upon how 
pro-militarist the statement is. The subject responds by indicating 
either agreement or disagreement with the sentiment of the statement. 
The equivalent numbers of statements with which the respondent agrees 
are totaled, giving a possible score between 0- lZZ. A higher score in-
dicates a more pacifistic position. 
Droba' s test was first administered to four hundred college stu-
dents at the University of Chicago. It yielded a mean of approximately 
11. 77 and a maximum standard deviation of z. 35. 41 These figures are 
considerably lower than the ones obtained in Chapter VI of this study. 
Two changes were made in the original test. The original test 
consisted of forty-four items. The final test was reduced to twelve 
40 
. Droba, Op. Cit., pp. 96-111. 
41 Ibid., p~ 108. 
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items by selecting every fourth statement from the original. The pri-
mary reason for abbreviating the test was reduction of the time needed 
to administer the questionnaire. This was justified because the scale 
was intended for this study primarily as an additional dimension to the 
IN scale. Its use as a separate independent variable is not crucial for 
the support of the alternate hypothesis. 
The essential quantitative characteristics of the scale were pre-
served, and no other judgment other than the choice of every fourth 
statement beginning with the first was used. The original scale ranged 
from Oto 462; the final scale from Oto 122. The hypothetical mean 
value of a statement on the original scale was 10. 5; for the final scale, 
10. The minimum statement value on the original scale was O; on the 
final scale also O. The maxi.mum statement value on the original was 
21; on the final scale also 21. 
The second modification was the oral administration of the test, 
which was originally administered silently. As in the case of the IN 
test, interviewers were allowed to repeat a statement twice if neces-
sary, but not allowed to reread or change a response once they had pro-
ceded t'o a following statement. 
The third section of the questionnaire is a twelve item informa-
tion level test (IL). The test was designed by the author to measure 
a wide range of familiarity with foreign affairs and foreign policy issues. 
Approximately 50 per cent 6£:the questions are concerned with United 
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States foreign policy; the remainder with foreign affairs in general. 
An attempt was made to insure wide geographic and issue distribution 
in both areas. The types of questions include: Name recognition, treaty 
recognition, country recognition, and situation recognition.' 
Generally, the questions proceed from the less difficult to the 
more difficult. The range <;>f difficulty is fairly large because of the 
possibility of having to scale persons of low education levels (less than 
eight years formal education) and low interest levels, with persons of 
high education levels (Ph.D.) and high interest levels. Pre-test results 
indicated that the test was capable of scaling both of these extremes, 
while preserving an acceptable distribution around the hypothetical mean 
score. These results are corroborated in the final survey results. 
The range of the scale is 0-60, five points being awarded for each cor-
rect answer. Higher sco~es indicate higher information levels. 
Two changes were made on the basis of pre-test experience. 
The test was administered orally, under the same rules of repetition 
and response change as the IN and MP tests. The length of the response 
choices in the IL test, however, tended to confuse a good number of 
respondents. Consequently, during the actual survey an answer sheet 
with the printed responses was given to the subject during the IL test. 
The statemen,ts and the responses were read by the interviewer while 
the subject followed the responses on his answer sheet. 
On the sample questionnaire provided in the Appendix the cor-
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rect answers are underlined. Question 28 has both "C" and "D" under-
lined. The test was prepared and pre-tested after President Nixon had 
announced the easing of some trade restrictions with the People's Re-
public of China, but before Presidential Advisor Henry Kissinger's first 
visit to mainland China. During the actual survey it bec_ame apparent 
that the visit, which had just taken place, made response "D" very close 
to a correct answer. Moderately informed respondents seemed quite 
confused about whether to answer "C" or "D". As a result, all respond-
ents were given credit for either "C" or "D" responses. Questionnaires 
used in the survey, of course, did not have underlined answers. 
The fourth section of the questionnaire includes questions relat-
ing to self-evaluation and demographic factors. Because of the rela-
tively low level of organizational membership, questions 41 through 43 
were combined in the post-coding to produce a single variable of "organi-
zation membership" (OM). The details of each demographic variable 
are discussed in Chapter VI under the appropriate section. 
The order of appearance of each section is significant. The 
IN and MP opinion tests were presented first to gain the respondent's 
confidence and a,cquaint him with the questionnaire. The IL test, which 
has correct or incorrect answer choices, is third, followed by the self-
evaluative and demographic questions. The interview experience of the 
author supports this particular organization as an effective means of 
gaining a respondent's confidence and reducing his inhibitions. · Chang·-
ing the order of the sections resulted in visible antagonism, and respond-
43 
ent irritation in some cases during the pre-tests. The final organiza-
tion plan of the questionnaire, then, is to proceed from the general to 
the specific. 
With the questionnaire designed, thirteen volunteer interviewers 
were chosen. A 11 were stud.ents at Eastern Illinois University. They 
received two one-hour briefings from the author. The first hour was 
devoted to an explanation of survey techniques and a checklist of "do' s 
and don'ts" of interviewing. 42 The second hour reviewed interviewing 
techniques and trained the interviewers in the use of the questionnaire 
and answer sheet employed in this survey. 
Subsequent meetings with interviewers after they had adminis-
tered pre -tests answered their questions resulting from initial field 
experiences. The pre-test indicated that the scales were well-adjusted 
and indicated some changes that were necessary. 43 
The samples used in this survey were drawn from two groups. 
A random sample of fifty faculty members at Eastern Illinois Univer-
sity was drawn. Initial estimates of the time available for interview-
ing suggested a sample size of approximately forty for each group. 
The faculty sample was "overdrawn" by ten to compensate for "not at 
homes" and refusals. The faculty sample is a fairly accurate propor-
tional representation of each school. 44 Because of the relatively small 
42 Backstrom and Hursh, Op. Cit., p. 138. 
43Ibid., pp. 129-130.' 
44The characteristics of the sample, including proportion of mem-
bers per school, education level, and male-to-female proportions were 
similar to overall characteristics of the faculty. 
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size of the sample, however, the proportionality of the sample by aca-
. demic department does not correspond with the population. 
The sample of elected county officials in Coles County includes 
the following groups: County Officers, County Supervisors; Assistant 
Supervisors; and County Highway Commissioners. The total is forty-
three persons. Forty successful interviews were completed. 
Approximately eighty per cent of the county official interviews 
and fifty per cent of the faculty interviews were completed in two weeks 
of field work. The remainder were accomplished in a third week of 
interviewing. 
At this stage, two limitations of this study become apparent. 
The use of volunteer interviewers who have limited training and experi-
ence is likely to introduce some amount of error or distortion. This 
may have been somewhat minimized by the training sessions, the pre-
test experience, close supervision, and the fact that the author completed 
approximately fifty per cent of the interviews. 
The size of the sample is also a limiting factor. The sample 
size was dictated primarily by the time available for completion of the 
survey within the requirements of statistical validity. 4 5 In one sense 
the necessity of using volunteer interviewers and the de sire for a large 
sample are mutually exclusive considerations. The confidence and re-
liability increments afforded by an increase in sample size may well 
45Blalock, Op. Cit., pp. 165-167, ZZ5-ZZ7. 
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have been counteracted by the increased distortion introduced by em-
ploying more interviewers, or by increasing the work load of existing 
· interviewers. A final balance of eighty respondents and thirteen inter-
viewers was decided upon. 
The results of the interviews were scored and post-coded accord-
ing to the directions in the Code Book included in the Appendix. The 
task was relatively straight-forward because of the use of closed responses 
and extensive pre-coding. 4 6 These data were transferred. to computer 
matrix sheets, and then to computer punch cards. 
The data and a program format detailing the operations to be 
performed on each variable was submitted to a technician £or program-
ming and processing. 
Two separate programs were employed. The. standard deviation, 
mean, standard error, and range of the data were determined using 
DMB01D. 47 The second program, DMBOZS, calculated the chi square, 
chi square d. f., contingency coefficient, and table percentages for the 
46Backstrom and Hursh discuss the advantages and disadvan-
tages of using "closed responses", in which the respondent has only 
listed options as choices. The central problem with "open responses" 
is the amount of time and effort required to code them for quantitative 
analysis. Further, they increase the time ·required to administer the 
interview. See Backstrom and Hursh, Op. Cit., pp. 73-74. 
47see W. J. Dixon, Ed., BMD: Biomedical Computer Programs 
(Berkely: University of California Press, 1964). 
46 
selected data. 48 
With the exception of the party affiliation variable, the tables 
are exclusively 2.x2. The size of the sample precluded the effective 
use of larger tables because of the possibility of encountering empty 
cells. 49 All demographic variables except occupation and academic 
discipline were tested for possible relationship with each of the three 
dependent variables, IN, MP, and IL. In turn, the dependent variables 
were tested for possible relationship among the three. Occupation and 
academic discipline were not tested for chi square significance because 
of the low number of cases in the resultant aggregates. 
Three levels of significance were used to evaluate the results: 
1. The alternate hypothesis is "supported" if a chi square of 
3. 841 or higher at . 05 probability is indicated. Essentially, this means 
that the chances of finding a chi square of this magnitude if the relation:..· 
ship between the two variables were random is one in twenty. 
2. The alternate hypothesis is "strongly supported" if a chi 
48For a description of BMD02S see Kenneth Janda, Data Pro-
cessing (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 159. 
The entire program format may be found in W. J. Dixo~, ed., BMD: 
Biomedical Computer Programs (Berkely: University of California 
Press, 1964). 
49 The accurate calculation of chi square requires at least five 
occurances per cell. For figures of five and below, Blalock suggests 
the use of a "continuity correction". Essentially, this tends to give more 
conservative. Because of the conservative criteria used to evaluate this 
data, however, no corrections were added. The use of larger than 2x2 
tables, however, would have necessitated the use of the correction in all 
cases, and made a good number of the tests invalid because of frequent 
occurances of empty cells. See Blalock, Op. Cit., pp. 220-ZZl. 
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square of 6. 635 or higher at . 01 probability is indicated. In this case, 
the chances are one in a hundred of a chi square of this magnitude with 
no relationship between the variables. 
3. The alternate hypothesis is "validated" if a chi square of 
10. 827 or higher at • 001 probability is indicated. At this level of con-
fidence, there is a 99. 9 per cent probability of the relationship between 
the variables being other than random. 50 
Standard error was used to evaluate the extent to which each 
dependent variable could be used effectively to test for a relationship 
with the independent variables. Key states that: "As the Standard of 
Error of estimate of Y approaches· in size the standard deviation of Y, 
the •.• degree of relationship between X and Y values declines. 1151 In 
no case did the standard of error approach the· standard deviation for 
the variables tested. 
The major limitation on the use of chi square is the relatively 
small size of the sample employed. No statistical corrections were 
used, however. In Chapter VI, the estimates of reliability become more 
conservative if cell numbers approach five or smaller. There is essen-
tially little advantage to employing a statistical device to compensate 
for continuity, as long as this is taken into consideration in the final 
50Blalock, Op. Cit., p. 452. 
51v. O. Key, A Primer of Statistics for Political Scientists 
(New York: Crowell, 1954), p. 93. 
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analysis of the data. 
It might be noted that although the relatively small size of this 
sample may cause some distortion of the results, large values of chi 
square are more difficult to obtain with a small sample.· I£ large values 
appear in a small sample, they indicate greater certainty of a relation-
ship than the same values for a large sample. 52 
Causal inferences from this sort of data must be made with cau-
tion. Chi square will indicate the existence of relationships significantly 
different than those expected under a given set of hypothetical assump-
tions (the null hypothesis). 53 It does not, however, indicate the direc-
tion of the relationship, or that the relationship is causal.' 
52 Blalock, Op. Cit., p. 230. 
53Ibid. 
CHAPTER VI 
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 
Preliminary Remarks 
The following analysis is a detailed description of the sample 
characteristics, the dependent variables, and the independent variables 
which produce significant relationships. Independent variables which 
yield less than ·significant relationships are discussed briefly. When 
appropriate, findings are related to previous research reported in this 
area. 
Tables that are especially long or only supplementary to the cen-
tral discussion are included in Appendix B. Where noted all figures 
are expressed as percentages. The number of respondents for the ag-
gregate (both groups combined) data is eighty; for faculty and county 
officials respectively, the number of respondents is always forty. The 
chi square and probability for each relationship are listed immediately 
below each table. A 11 decimal figures are rounded to the nearest one-
tenth. 
On the basis of the levels of significance presented in Chapter V, 
49 
50 
the degree to which each relationship supports the hypothesis under in-
ve stigation is assessed. 
Quantitative Profile of the Sample 
This is a brief consideration of some 0£ the major characteris-
tics of the sample. 54 When both groups are combined to yield aggregate 
results, they produce the following mean scores: Nationalism-Interna-
tionalism (IN) • 39. 9; Militarism-Pacificism (MP) • 55. 3; Information 
Level (IL) • 40. 8. 55 
The mean of the IN variable compares favorably with the actual 
mean of Levins·on's original study. The original mean score of 31.8 
is close enough to the mean score of this study to indicate that attitudes 
on this scale have not shifted appreciably since 1957. 56 Likewise, the 
small differences between the range and standard deviation of Levinson' s 
study and this study are not significant if differences iri the groups under 
analysis are taken into account. 
The mean score of the MP variable, however, is considerably 
higher than Droba' s original 11. 8. The higher standard deviation and 
greater range of scores in this study indicates a shift to pacifist attitudes 
and considerably less consensus of attitudes since Droba' s initial study 
54 A complete quantitative profile of the sample 'is found in Ap-. 
pendix B. 
55See Appendix B. 
56 
Levinson, Op. Cit., pp. 37-47. 
51 
57 . 
in 1931. Many factors combine to account for this shift. American 
experiences in the Korean War, and more recently in Viet Nam, have 
· undoubtedly contributed to changing this attitude. The rather grim real-
ities of these wars and the advent of nuclear weapons may figure largely 
in the shift to a more pacifist mean score. The divisive effects of United 
States involvement in Viet Nam may contribute to the larger range of 
opinion. 
The IL mean score of the actual survey is close to the pre-test 
mean score. Because this test was developed especially for this sur:..· 
vey, no previous results are available for comparison. 
The relatively small size of the sample and the low instances 
of membership in voluntary organizations in many cases necessitated 
combining the three categories to produce one variable of organization 
membership~ This may result in some distortion of the variable because 
passive membership in a professional organization, for example, is 
obviously quite different from active participation in a civic organization. 
The respondents belong to an average of five voluntary organi-
zations each. The faculty group belongs to an average of six organiza-
tions; the county official group to three. On the average, then, faculty 
respondents belong to 50 per cent more organizations than county offi-
cials. 
The average age of the respondents is 47 years. Both the faculty 
57Droba, Op. Cit., pp. 96-111. 
52 
and county official group have approximately 11 years of experience 
either as teachers or as county officials. 
The mean IN score of the faculty is 34. Z, compared with the 
county officials' mean IN of 45.5. This indicates that the faculty group 
is considerably less nationalist than the county official group. The stan-
dard deviation of the two groups i.s approximately the same. 
The mean MP score for the two groups is nearly the same. The 
faculty mean is 56. The county official mean is 54. Z. This suggests 
that the tendency toward militarism or pacifism is independent of dif-
ferent elite group membership. 
The mean IL score of the county officials is higher than that of 
the faculty. Initially, this would indicate that the county officials, on 
the whole, are more informed than the faculty. The faculty mean score 
is 40. 4; the county official, 41. Z. Examination of the standard devia-
tions, however, illustrates that as a group, the faculty is more consis-
tently well-informed than the county officials. The standard deviation of 
the faculty is 8.4; the county official, 63. 9. These standard deviations 
would produce the following curves if distribution were normal: 
0 
Figure 4 
Distribution Curves of Faculty and County Official 
Groups for Information Level (Normality assumed) 
S.D. = 8.4 
Mean = 40. 4 
Faculty 
70 0 
S.D. = 63.4 
Mean=41.Z 
County Officials 
70 
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If all of the individuals studied are under the curves drawn in 
Figure 4, then it is apparent that most of the faculty members are clus-
tered in the middle near the mean; that is, they all scored about the 
same on the scale. For the county officials, however, the relatively 
flat curve demonstrates that a sizeable number of county officials are 
highly informed, and a sizeable number have virtually no information. 
The implication of these two curves is that the faculty is more 
consistently informed as a group than the county officials. Approximately 
60 per cent of the faculty scored within 8 point·s of the mean. The county. 
officials; on the other hand, more consistently varied from the mean 
score.; 
The Dependent Variables 
Each dependent variable was matched with every other dependent 
variable produ.cing a total of nine possible relationships. With the ex-
ception of two relationships, the variables indicated nearly complete 
independence from each other. This is especially important for the MP 
and IN variables. Essentiallyp this independence reconfirms the propo-
sition that militarism-pacificism and nationalism-internationalism are 
separate and distinct attitudes. On the basis of the scales used in this 
study, four categories of individuals may be established depending on· 
their MP and IN scores: (1) militarist-nationalists; (Z) pacifist-
nationalists; (3) militarist-internationalists; (4) pacifist-internationalists. 
54 
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the distribution of the faculty and county 
officials over the two scales. The intersection of the axes is the hypoth-
etical median of the two scales. 
Figure 5 
Distribution of ·Faculty Sample Over 
Nationalism-Internationalism and Militarism-Pacificism Scales 
I 
Pacifist 
122 
II 
General distribution 
~~--------------..\.-----~~+---t------..ia..w..a.._.... ______ ~--- 70 0 
Internationalist 
III: 
0 
Militarist 
Figure 6 
Nationalist 
IV 
Distribution of County Officials Sample Over 
Nationalism-Internationalism and Militarism-Pacificism Scales 
Pacifist 
122 
I II 
General area of 
0 ~~--d~is_t_r~i_b_u_t_i~o.n ________________ -f-------~-1---------------~-----70 
Internationalist Nationalist 
III 
0 
Militarist 
IV 
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This type of analysis permits a more precise description of groups 
of individuals. Quadrant I includes group with internationalist-pacifist 
attitudes; quadrant 11, nationalist-pacifist: quadrant Ill, internationalist-
militarist: quadrant IV, nationalist-militarist. Evidence in this study . 
. indicates that the nationalist-internationalist dimension is highly depend-
ent on demographic factors. The militarist-pacificist di.mension, on 
the other hand, is somewhat independent of demographic factors. McClosky' s 
study of the psychological determinants of foreign affairs dispositions 
indicates that this dimension may be dependent on complex psychological 
factors. 58 
Table 1 indicates a significant relationship between militarism-
pacificism and nationalism-internationalism among county officials. 
For this group only, there is a slight tendency for nationalists to be 
also militarist and internationalists to be also pacifist. This more closely 
coincides with the common stereotypes of nationalists and internation-
alists. The relationship does not obtain for either the faculty group or 
the aggregate, however. 
Level of information is independent of militarism-pacificism 
and nationalism-internationalism except in one instance. Table 2 in-
dicates a slight tendency in the aggregate toward high information levels 
being characteristic of internationalists, and low information levels 
being characteristic of nationalists. The relationship is not significant 
58McClosky, Op. Cit., pp. 77-78. 
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when the two groups are tested separately. The existence of a signifi,-
cant relationship in the aggregate, however, indicates that. further re-
lationships might obtain if the scales and the test were to have more 
discriminatory powers. For example, in a larger sample the use of 
interval scales and linear correlation might establish a stronger rela-
tionship. 
TABLE 1 
Militarism-Pacificism and Nationalism-Internationalism 
Among County Officials 
(Table Percentages) 
Militarism Pacifism 
Nationalism 10.3 s. 1 
Internationalism 41. 43.6 
.Level of 
Information 
TABLE 2 
Chi Square 4. 9 
P ( .05 
Nationalism-Internationalism and 
Level of Information 
(Both Groups- -Percentages) 
Nationalism 
High 10. 1 
Low 38.0 
Internationalism 
22.8 
29.l 
Chi Square = 14. 6 
P{ .05 . · 
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Analysis of the Independent Variables 
Sex, Marital Status, and Age 
No significant relationships exist between the dependent vari- . 
ables and sex or marital status. Slight tendencies toward significance 
in a few instances are discounted because of the low number of females 
and the low number of unmarried respondents. Relationships with ini-
tially low frequencies in the independent variables must be viewed con-
servatively. Unless the relationship is well into the significance range 
its validity is highly questionable. 
Age is a significant factor in the aggregate and the county offi-
cial group. Table 3 indicates a tendency of nationalists to be above the 
mean age for both groups and internationalists to be below the mean age. 
Age 
TABLE 3 
Nationalism-Internationalism and Age 
(Both Groups--Percentages} 
Nationalism 
Above Mean 33~7 
Below Mean 15. 
Internationalism 
22.5 
28.7 
Chi Square = 5. 2 
P ( .05 
Table 4 shows that the relationship is even stronger among county 
officials. In general, younger members of the group tend to be interna-
tionalist, older members tend to be nationalists. For the county official 
-----~---
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group. the relationship is one significance level stronger: in the aggre-
gate p is less than • 05; in the county official group p is less than • 01. 59 
Age 
TABLE 4 
Nationalism-Internationalism and 
Age of County Officials 
(Percentages) 
Nationalism Internationalism 
Above Mean 32.5 
Below Mean 17.5 
12.5 
37.5 
Chi Square = 6. 5 
p(. 01 
No relationship obtained for the faculty group when age was tested. 
This would tend to indicate that if increasing age is coincident with a 
certain attitudinal myopia. the effects are more pronounced in groups 
which are less mobile and less educat_ed on the average. Also. older 
individuals whose attitude structures were formed soon after the United 
States' experience in World War I and during the Depression of the 1930' s 
are likely to reflect these experiences in their increased nationalism. 
Again. tests with more discriminatory power, such as linear correla-
tion, might discern more precise trends. 
In no case is age found to be a significant determinant of militarism-
pacificism or level of information. 
59see Chapter v:, for a description of the significa11;ce levels em-
ployed in this study. 
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Level of Interest, Television Viewing, 
Newspaper Reading, and Occupation 
Respondents were placed into a high interest level group if they 
indicated that they were "very interested in foreign affairs" or "mod-
erately interested". Responses of "interested, but not informed," or 
"not at all interested" were categorized as low interest levels. Tests 
yielded two significant relationships: (1) Information level and level 
of interest for the aggregate; (2) Nationalism-internationalism and level 
of information for county officials. 
Table 5 indicates an inverse relationship between information 
level and level of interest for the 'aggregate. As level of interest de-
clines, information level incr.eases. 
Interest 
TABLE 5 
Information Level and Level of Interest 
(Both Groups- -Percentages) 
Information Level 
High 
High 7.6 
Low 25.3 
Low 
31. 6 
35.4 
Chi Square • 4. 2 
p ( • 05 
The relationship does not exist when the aggregate is broken 
down into faculty and county official groups. The explanation of this 
somewhat curious relationship, which was unexpected, is that level of 
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interest is a self-evaluation variable. The data indicates that the fac-
ulty group consistently under-estimated their level of interest vis-a-vis 
their level of information. On the other hand, the county officials con-
sistently over-estimated their level of interest vis-a-vis their score on 
the level of information sea le. 
The problem is not only one of proper self-evaluation. Respond-
ents in each group appear to be comparing their level of interest to that 
of their peers. A biology instructor is not likely to be as diligent a 
reader in international affairs as a political science instructor. Conse-
quently, he rates himself as "interested, but not informed~'. A county 
official, however, whose absolute level of interest is lower than the 
biology instructor's may well rate himself as moderately interested. 
Re lati've to his peers, the county official is moderately interested. With 
this problem in mind, the value of some objective means of measuring 
level of interest should be apparent. 
Table 6 indicates, that among county officials, higher levels of 
interest are more likely to be expressed by internationalis~s than nation-
alists. To the extent that their self-evaluations are accurate, this rela-
tionship is somewhat circular. Less interested individuals will tend to 
select the information to which they are exposed. As they are exposed 
to less information about international affairs, the focus of their interest 
narrows to nationalist concerns:. 
Although the relationship between nationalism-internationalism 
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and level of interest is in the second significance level for the county 
official group, it is not significant in either the aggregate or the faculty 
group. Again, the major difficulty in dealing with this variable is that 
it is self-evaluative. 
Level of 
Interest 
TABLE 6 
Nationalism-Internationalism and Level of Interest 
(County Officials- -Percentages) 
Nationalism 
High 12.5 
Low 37.5 
Internationalism 
30 
20 
Chi Square • 5. 0 
p (. 01 
Level of interest is not significantly related to militarism-
pacificism in any group. 
The two variables, reading newspapers and watching television 
are, in a sense, self-evaluative. Then too, the questions used to mea-
sure these factors were not refined enough to discriminate between those 
who followed international affairs and those who did not. No significant 
relationships were found between television viewing and any of the depend-
ent variables. One reason for this is that 82. 5 per cent of the respondents 
indicated that they watch television news regularly. This means that 
without more questions tapping levels of viewing and kinds of programs 
watched, it is nearly impossible to explain the role of this variable (given 
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the small size of the sample and the characteristics of the c;hi square 
test, also). 
Consistent newspaper reading is significant in one instance: Even 
though approximately 70 per cent of the county officials indicated that 
they consistently read newspapers. Those who claim consistent reading• 
habits are more likely to be internationalist than those who do not. 
Those reporting that they do not consistently read newspapers are more 
likely to be nationalist (see Table 7). 
Read 
Do not Read 
TABLE 7 
Nationa lism-lnternationalism and 
Consistent Newspaper Reading 
(Both Groups- -Percentages) 
Nationalism 
35 
l'J. 7 
Internationalism 
47.5 
3.7 
Chi Square = 6. 0 
p < . 05 
Although the relationship is moderately significant for the county 
o!ficial groups, it is not significant for the aggregate or the faculty group. 
A gain, the variable would be more valuable if the questionnaire had probed 
deeper: local newspaper reading, for example, could have been distin-
guished from metropolitan newspaper reading. News magazine reading 
could have been measured separately. 
The imprecision of the variable is evident in the lack of correla-
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tion between consistent newspaper reading and level of information • 
. Most of the statements in the level of information scale are taken from 
newspapers. 
No analysis has been made of the occupation responses of the 
county officials. The wide range of occupations would have created so 
many categories that, given the sample size, small numbers in the cells 
would have made statistical analysis invalid. For the same reason, the 
faculty group was not divided into disciplines or schools. The size and 
characteristics of the sample meant that even mean scores of the depen-
dent variables would be of questionable accuracy. 
Natives of Illinois 
Tables 8 and 9 show a relationship between natives of Illinois 
and level of information and nationalism-int~rnationalism in the aggre-
_gate. There is a tendency for nati':"es of Illinois to be slightly less in-
formed than non-natives. Also, natives tend to be· nationalist, whereas 
non-natives tend to be internationalist. Both relationships are of a sec-
ond level of significance where p is less than • 01. 
Natives 
Non-natives 
TABLE 8 
Info.rmation Level and Natives of Illinois 
(Both Groups- -Percentages) 
Information Level 
High 
15.Z 
17.7 
Low 
50.6 
16.S 
Chi Square • 6. 7 
p ( .01 
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TABLE 9 
Nationalism-Internationalism and Natives of Illinois 
(Both Groups- -Percentages) 
Nationalism 
Natives 40.0 
Non-natives 8.7 
Internationalism 
Z6.Z 
zs.-o 
Chi Square • 8. 4 
p (. 01 
At first glance, the data seem to indicate that more highly mo-
bile persons tend to be better informed and r,nore internationalist than 
less mobile individuals. The finding must be qualified, however, by 
two factors. To some extent, mobility parallels elite group member-
ship. App!oximately 94 per cent of the county officials a.re natives of 
Illinois. Only 37. S per cent. of the faculty group are natives. This means 
that level of education and elite group membership are factors in the de-
termination of the relationships between :attitudes and mobility (Tables 
8 and 9). 
Organization Membership 
The results in Table 10 are slightly below the first order of sig-
nificance established for this study. A chi square of 3. Z when p is less 
than. 10, however, is close enough to the first order of significance to 
warrant its inclusion. In the aggregate there is a slight tendency of 
nationalism to be coincident with relatively low organization member-
ship and internationalism with relatively high organization membership. 
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The trend is slight, however, especially since the organization member-
ship variable is a combined variabl~ ( see Chapter V). 
TABLE 10 
Nationalism-Internationalism and Organization Membership 
· (Both Groups- -Percentages) 
Organization 
Membership 
High 
Low 
Nationalism 
18.8 
30.0 
Internationalism 
30.0 
21. Z 
Chi Square = 3. Z 
p ( • 10 
There is no significant relationship between organizational mem-
bership and militarism-pacificism or level of information. Further, 
the relationship between organization membership and nationalism-
internationalism is not significant when.the aggregate was divided into 
faculty and county official groups. 
Party Affiliation 
McClosky' s study of Democratic and Republican leaders and fol-
lowers in a nation-wide survey suggests a possible relationship between 
isolationism and party affiliation. Although McClosky' s isolationism scale 
is s.omewhat different, and his sample is significantly different, his find-
. ings are persuasive enough to warrant testing by this study. McClosky 
finds a distinct· tendency for Republicans to be more isolationist than 
Democrats, especially among the party leadership. The relationship 
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is even stronger when level of education is a controlling factor. 60 
The results in Table 11 reinforce McClosky' s findings. At a 
second, order of significance, Democrats are more likely to be interna-
tionalist; Republicans tend to be nationalist. 
TA,BLE 11 
Nationalism-Internationalism and Party Affiliation 
(Both Groups--Row Percentages) 
Democratic (N=40) 
Republican (N= 34) 
Independent (N•6) 
100% 
Nationalist 
0 
Internationalist 
100% 
Chi Square = 7. 0 
p (. 01 
The relationship in Table 11 does not obtain for the county offi-
cial group which was divided evenly among nationalists and internation-
alists. As Table 12 illustrates, however, there is a second order of 
significance relationship among the faculty group. This may indicate a 
greater amount of ideological elaboration and consistency among the 
faculty than among the county officials. At higher levels of education, 
members of intellectual elites may tend to engage in more cognitive ex-
plorations of the implications of their respective party affiliations. 
60McClosky, Op. £!!., p. 82. 
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TABLE 12 
Nationalism-Internationalism and 
Party Affiliation Among Faculty 
(Row Percentages) 
1 OOo/o 
Democratic (N= 18) · 
Republican (N•l6) 
Independent (N•6) 
Nationalism 
0 
Internationalism 
Chi Square = 4. S 
p < • 01 
1 OOo/o 
Party affiliation is the independent variable which had the most 
significant relationship with militarism-pacificism. Table 13 indicates 
a first order of significance relationship between party affiliation and 
militarism-pacificism. Democrats are more likely to be relatively 
pacifist, while Republicans are more likely to be militarist oriented. 
TABLE 13 
Militarism-Pacificism and Party Affiliation 
. (Both Groups--Ro~ Percentages) 
Democratic (N=39) 
Republican (N= 34) 
Independent {N•6) 
100% 
Militarist 
0 
Pacifist 
Chi Square • S. 7 
p <. OS 
100% 
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As in the relationship of party affiliation to nationalism-inter-
nationa lism, the relationship obtains for the faculty group, but not as 
significantly for the county official group. Table 14 shows that the re-
lationship is stronger when elite· group membership is a controlled fac-
tor. It is important to note that 10, 3 per cent of the independents were 
pacifist. The relationship among the faculty is highly significant. This 
third order relationship is especially important in view of the fact that 
no other independent variable in this study correlates as closely with 
militarism-pacificism. The general trend is present in the county offi-
cial group, but is less significant. 
The display of Tables 11 through 14 with bars representing row 
percentages aids visual comparison of the amount of overlap among the 
groups. This. is especially helpful when presenting 3x2 tables. Several 
features become apparent in this arrangement. In Table 11, for exam-
ple, the chi square result is stJ,ongly affected by the occurance of 100 
per cent of independents in the internationalist category. The consider-
able amount of overlap between the Democrats and Republicans indicates 
that the relationship is not as significant for the two parties. 
Table 14 illustrates a more convincing statistical distribution. 
There is little overlap between Democrats and Republicans, suggesting 
that the relationship obtains for the two major parties in the faculty 
group. The large amount of overlap in the county official group and 
the low chi square demonstrate a situation in which there is very little 
Democratic (N• 17) 
Republican (N= 16) 
Independent (N•6) 
TABLE 14 
Militarism-Pacifici.sm and Party Affiliation 
Among Faculty and County Officials 
(Row Percentages) 
Faculty 
Militarist Pacifist 
100% 0 100% _ _.;... _______ _,_ ______ _ 
Chi Square • 12. 4 
p ( . 001 
Militarist 
100% 
(N•22) 
(N• 18) 
(N•O) 
County Officials 
Pacifist 
0 100% 
Chi Square • 1. 0 
p(. 50 
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relationship bet.ween the variables. 
Level of Education, Social Science Gour se 
Background, and Elite Group Membership 
The independent variables in this section are directly related 
to the validation of the hypotheses advanced in Chapter III. Information 
collected about the preceding independent variables provides valuable 
background for the testing of the hypotheses, but is only indirectly re-
lated to them. 
Table 15 provides strong support for the hypothesis that more 
highly educated individuals are more likely to be highly informed. The 
chi square of the relationship is 10. 3 where p is less than . 01. This 
is a second order of significance according to the criteria of this study. 
Close examination of Table 15 indicates that the impact of level 
of education on level of information is especially ncticeable among low 
levels of education. The highly educated are more evenly divided be-
tween high and low information levels. In low levels of education, how-
ever, there is a strong tendency for these individuals to also exhibit 
low information levels. For the aggregate, therefore, it can be said 
that there is strong support for the hypothesis that level of information 
varies positively with level of education. 
Almond has reported that: 
On questions involving knowledge of facts affecting 
foreign policy it was found that the college-educated 
contained four or five times as many informed per-
sons as the grade school sample. 61 
61 Almond, Op. Cit., p. 127. 
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TABLE 15 
Information Level and Level of Education 
(Both Groups- -Percentages) 
Information Level 
High 
High 30.4 
Level of Education----------------
Low 2.. s 
Chi Square 
p(. 01 
Low 
38.0 
2.9. 1 
= 10. 3 
The inclusion of high school level respondents in Table 1 S un-
doubtedly tends. to make the results of this study less striking than Almond's. 
The level of significance .obtained, however, confirms Almond's initial 
findings. ~ 
.. 
When the aggregate is divided into faculty and county official 
groups, the relationship between level of education and level of informa-
tion is not as significant. Table 16 indicates a general trend toward 
the relationship established by Table 15. 
In an effort to discover whether the distinction between high and 
low education might affect the results, the data were retested. For the 
faculty group the high level of education cut-off became the Ph.D. level 
instead of the M.A. level. For the county officials, high school became 
the new cut ... off point. No significant changes in the strength of the rela-
tionships occu;red as a result of these attempts. 
72 
TABLE16 
Information Level and Level of Education 
Among Faculty and County Officials 
(Percentages) 
Level of Education 
:=============== 
Information Level 
Faculty 
High Low 
High 62.5 2 7. 5 
Low 2.5 7.5 
Chi Square = 3. 1 
p (. 10 
County Official 
High Low 
10.3 25.6 
5. 1 59.0 
Chi Square • Z. 9 
p (. 10 
Two significant inferences are drawn from the analysis of Tables 
15 and 16. First, the largest differences in level of information appear 
to be the result of some college exposure, that is, undergraduate study. 
Evidently, an increased inclination to be informed about international 
affairs tapers off after some college work. The differences between 
the levels of information among individuals with Ph.D. degrees and 
those with B,.A., degrees is not highly significant. Similarly, the di£-
ference between individuals with grade school education and those with 
high school education is of a lower order of significance. 
Secondly, these tables indicate that elite group membership is 
a significant factor in the determination of level of information. In the 
aggregate, the differences between low levels of education and high levels 
of information are the greatest. Approximately ZO per cent of the county 
~I 
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officials had completed some college study, whereas 100 per cent of 
.the faculty were in the high level of education category. To some ex-
tent, then, this would imply a relationship between elite group member-
ship and level of information. This tendency will be discussed in more 
detail later i·n tho study. At this point it is sufficiont to noto that intra-
group differences in levels of information are significantly less than 
differences among the aggregate. 
The test illustrated by Table 17 yields a third order of signifi-
cance relationship between level of education and nationalism-interna-
tionalism. For the aggregate, the chi square is 15. 8 where p is less 
than. 001. Under these conditions, the proposition that individuals of 
high levels of education are more likely to be internationalists is vali-
dated. Also, individuals of low levels of education are more likely to 
be nationalist. 
TABLE 17 
Nationalism-Internationalism and Level of Education 
(Both Groups- -Percentages) 
Nationalism 
High 22.5 
Level of Education 
Low 26.Z 
Internationalism 
45.0 
6.3 
Chi Square• 15.8 
p ( • 001 
It is important to note that only 6. 3 per cent of the respondents 
are internationalists with low levels of education. The lower right cell 
74 
of Table 1 7 contains the smallest percentage of respondents in the table. 
This information quite clearly confirms the hypothesis that increased 
levels of education are positively related to increased internationalism. 
The relationship does not appear as strong when the groups are 
tested separately, however. Table 18 illustrates that a trend toward 
this relationship exists among county officials, but not among faculty. 
For the county officials, the hypothesis is strongly supported with a chi 
square of 4. 0 where p is less than . 01. 
Level of 
TABLE 18 
Nationalism-Internationalism and Level of Education 
Among Faculty and County Officials 
Nationalism-Internationalism 
Faculty (N = 40) County Official (N • 40) 
Nationalist Internationalist Nationalist Internationalist 
High 42.5 47.5 10 25 
Education Low 5 5 40 25 
Chi Square = .01 Chi Square • .4. 0 
p (. 90 p (. 01 
Among the county officials, internationalists are equally divided 
into high and low education levels. The nationalists in this group, how-
ever, were much more likely to exhibit low education levels. 
In the faculty group, both the high and low education levels were 
almost equally divided into nationalists and internationalists. From 
Table 18 it is evident that the faculty group is preponderently in the 
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high level of education category. The low frequencies in the low level 
of education category prompted a resort of the data along the lines de .. · 
scribed previously under the level of information variable. No sJgnifi-
cant change in the chi square of the test resulted after re-establishing 
cut-off points. 
As mentioned before, this lack of a high level of significance 
among the faculty group may indicate that increased tendencies toward 
internationalism taper off after initial exposure to college education. 
Because the differences noted in the aggregate are more significant than 
when elite group membership is controlled for, this implies that group 
membership has an impact on nationalism-internationalism. 
In an effort to discern the impact of social science courses on 
level of information, the test illustrated by Table 19 was performed. 
The test produced a chi square of 19. 3 where p is less than . 001. This 
is well over a third order of significance. The hypothesis that individuals 
with relatively high levels of social science course background are more 
likely to be well informed is validated. The relationship is especially 
evident at low levels of social science background. Only 5. 1 per cent 
of respondents exhibited low social science background and high levels 
of information in the aggregate. On the other hand, 45. 6 per cent of 
respondents from low social science backgrounds were in the low infor-
mation level category. Among respondents from high social science ,, 
backgrounds, the difference between high and low information levels 
is not as large. 
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TABLE 19 
Information Level and Social Science Course Background 
(Both Groups- -Percentages) 
Social Science 
Background 
High 
Low 
Information Level 
High 
27.8 
5 •. 1 
Low 
21. 5 
45.6 
Chi Square = 19. 3 
p (. 001 
The same trend is present when the aggregate is divided into 
the two elite groups. As in previous tests, the significance in the fac-
ulty group is much lower than either the aggregate or the county offi-
cial group. The faculty group yielded a chi square of I. 0, but the 
county official group produced a chi square of 4. 3. Because the ques-
tionnaire did not distinguish between types of social science courses, 
it is impossible to determine whether there is an actual quantitative limit 
where social science courses cease contributing to increased levels of 
information or whether the specific subject area of courses influences 
levels of information. In the aggregate, however, the positive influence 
of social science course background on internationalism is evident. 
The results presented in Table 2 0 support the hypothesis that in-
dividuals from high levels of social science background are more likely 
to be internationalist. For the aggregate, the test obtained a chi square 
of 12.9 where pis less than .001. 
,---
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TABLE 20 
Nationalism-Internationalism and Social Science Course Background 
(Both Groups--Percentages) 
=======================-==-=-=======-===== =======-c:or:=-==============---==-
Social Science 
Course Background 
High. 
Low 
Nationalism 
13.7 
35.0 
Internationalism 
35.0 
16 •. 2 
Chi Square = 12. 9 
p ( . 001 
Within the two elite groups the positive relationship between so-
cial science background and internationalism is less s1.gnificant. A chi 
square of 4. 3 where pis less than. 01 was obtained from the county of-
ficial group. In this case, the hypothesis is strongly supported. Pos,-
sibly because the questionnaire does not have sufficient discriminatory 
powers at very high levels of social science course background, no sig-
nificance was determined from the faculty group. Again, it is worth-
. while mentioning that internationalism may increase up to a certain level 
of social science course background and then stabilize at a given level. 
Also, types of courses may be important in determining the impact'. of 
this variable on internationalism. 
The results presented in Table 21 provide strong support for the 
hypothesis that level of information is dependent on specific elite group 
membership. It. chi square of 10. 7 where· pis less than. 01 establishes 
a second order of significance for this relationship. 62 Faculty mem-
62 A chi square of 10. 7 is • 1 away from a third order relationship. 
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bers were evenly divided into high and low level respondents. The county 
officials, however, were much more likely to be in the low level of in-
formation category. Approximately 84 per cent of the county officials 
scored below the aggregate mean on the level of information scale. 
Faculty 
TABLE 21 
Information Level and ~lite Group Membership 
(Both Groups--Percentages) 
Information Level 
High 
25.3 
County Officials 7.6 
Low 
25.3 
41. 8 
Chi Square = IO. 7 
p ( . 0 I 
Evidence presented earlier in this chapter demonstrated that the 
mean score of the county official group on the IL scale was slightly higher 
than the faculty mean score. It was also noted that the standard devi-
ation of the county official group was much larger than that of the fac-
ulty group. Combined with Table 21, this indicates that the few county 
officials who scored above the mean on the IL scale scored very high. 
The remainder either scored on or closely below the mean. The dis-
' 
tribution of the faculty group around the mean appears more "normal", 
although the curve is rather steeply sloped. 
Table 22 illustrates the relationship which is the most signifi-
cant of all those that were tested in this study. This test yielded a chi 
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square of 22. 0 where pis less than . 001. The hypothesis that nationalism-
internationalism is dependent on specific elite group membership is 
validated. The faculty group consistently tended to be more internation-
alist than the county official group. The county official group were con-
sistently more nationalist than the faculty group. On the basis of the 
information in this study, elite group memberships appear to be the 
single most important factor in the determination of nationalism-inter-
nationalism. 
TABLE 22 
Nationalism-Internationali~m and Elite Group Membership 
(Both Groups- -Percentages) 
Nationalism 
Faculty 11. 2 
County Official 37.5 
Internationalism 
38.7 
12.5 
Chi Square = 22. 0 
p (.001 
This striking relationship is the result of the combination of a 
number of factors. High levels of mobility, education, social science 
course background, and organization membership, all of which are more 
or less associated with internationalism, are exhibited by the faculty 
group. Similarly, low levels of these variables, which are associated 
with nationalism, are apparent in the county official group. The com-
bination of these factors, however, falls short of totally explaining the 
very strong relationship between elite group membership and nationalism-
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internationalism. Clearly, elite group membership in itself is an add-
itional and important variable in the determination of nationalist or 
internationalist attitudes. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
This paper offers support for the contention that demographic 
variables .are significant determinants of political attitudes. Experi-
ence gained in this study also provides the basis for suggestions for 
further research in this area, especially in view of the following con-
clusions. 
The significant relationship between high levels of formal educa-
tion and internationalist dispositions is an important finding for foreign 
policy decision-making analysis. For instance, one might speculate 
that as the average level of education in a nation increases, the more 
difficult it would become for leadership to gain public acceptance of 
strictly nationalist-oriented foreign policies. In this circumstance, 
increasingly internationalist foreign policies would coincide more closely 
with existing attitudes, 
The results in this study indicate that a more highly educated 
electorate is also likely to be better informed about foreign affairs. 
Generally high levels of information among the electorate in a democ-
racy might result in more careful scrutiny of proposed foreign policies. 
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This would tend to make policy makers responsible for more extensive 
and open justification of their proposals and actions. 
Considered with the other findings, the strong relationship be-
tween elite group membership and foreign affairs dispositions carries 
important implications. To some extent, foreign policy is formulated 
in the context of the values and attitudes of the electorate. This study 
indicates that at least some of the attitudes are determined by factors 
which are beyond the immediate control of any one administration. 
Furthermore, the large number and variety of elite groups in the United 
States indicates the difficulties that leaders encounter when attempting 
to formulate a consensus of opinion on a particular foreign policy is sue. 
This not only underscores the complexity of a President's task of 
opinion leading, but also may indicate the extent to which an administra-
tion is limited in the range of foreign policy alternatives that it may 
adopt. The illustration that foreign affairs dispositions are at least par-
tially determined by demographic variables therefore implies that the 
task of a foreign policy decision-maker is to opt for the policy which 
most closely coincides with the dispositions of most of the electorate, .. 
This is somewhat analogous to the mathematical problem of cal-
culating the position of a straight line through a field of points so that 
the line is as close as possible to every point. The decision-maker's 
problem is ~onsiderably more complex because he has more "points" 
to deal with, and they may be slowly moving as he attempts his calcu-
lation., 
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0{ course, a good number of alternative policies are precluded 
by the strategies of the particular international situation. Also, the 
possibility of secret foreign policy moves means that the dispositions 
of the electorate· are not necessarily equally relevant in all situations. 
It should be noted that these findings do not deny a President's 
ability to form and lead public opinion on foreign policy. The decision 
to emphasize one issue instead of another, for example, no doubt molds 
opinion to some extent. These findings, however, indicate that an admin-
istration operates within definable parameters of public disposition that 
it can violate only at a risk to its acceptability to the electorate. The 
parameters may shift gradually as level of education and group mem-
bership change, but it is probably safe to propose that their control is 
beyond the capability of even a two-term administration. 
Better substantiation of these conclusions would involve research 
in the area of public opinion-foreign policy linkages. Research in this 
area would attempt to discover a relationship between public opinion 
content and foreign policy content over a specific period of time. Further 
research at the level of analysis employed by this study, however, might 
use several refinements in technique. More extensive and more precise 
survey research would allow one to advance the previous conclusions with 
fewer qualifications and greater certainty. 
Two variables, social science course background and organiza-
tion membership, illustrate one of the most significant problems for 
this study. In both cases, the causal flow of the relationship might run 
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in the opposite direction. Specifically, it may be the case that indivi-
duals of internationalist disposition tend to enroll in more social science 
courses and join more voluntary organizations. Also, the flow may run 
in both directions, where the attitude encourages the activity, and the 
activity reinforces the attitude. 
More extensive studies of parent-child samples and pre-college· 
followed by post-college tests would contribute to a better understanding 
of these relationships. :Research designed to establish the relationship 
between nationalism-internationalism and other political and social atti-
tude s might short cut this problem somewhat. Although the existence 
and direction of a cause-effect relationship is debatable, the significance 
of the relationships illustrates that the variables are useful indicators 
of existing attitudes. 
The factor separating truly useful indicators from merely inter-
esting ones is the conceptual and operational precision of the measuring 
instrument. It may be noted without embarrassment that the instruments 
and scales employed in this study could be refined considerably. For 
instance, if all scales had been interval, linear regression analysis 
would have been possible. This would have added a degree of statistical 
precision to th~ final product. Even though the scales had been exten-
sively pre-tested, t!1ey could have been changed in some cases to good 
advantage. Larger samples would yield more reliable results. The list 
of possible improvements and modifications is perhaps endless. 
One of the purposes of this study, however, was to determine 
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whether these specific sets of variables merit further and more sophis-
ticated investigation, The existence of highly significant relationships 
at this level of sophistication justifies the use of more refined methods 
and more extensive procedures for further re search in this area, 
APPENDIX A 
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The survey that you have been asked to participate in is being 
done in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Masters Degree at 
Eastern Illinois University. The results of your questionnaire wi 11 be 
kept comp lctc ly confidentia 1. Eventually the information from over one 
hundred such questionnaires will·be compiled ·for academic purposes. 
This study will not express any individual's opinion, but rather considers 
op1n1ons of groups of people: For instance, older people's versus younger 
people's opinions, and men's versus women's opinions, 
In its completed form, this study will be on file 
at Eastern Illinois University as of December 1, 19 71. 
may read the results in Booth after that date. 
in Booth Library 
If you wish, you 
You have been selected by techniques which make it important 
that you in particular respond to the questionnaire. Your cooperation 
is invaluable and will be greatly appreciated. 
Thank You, 
Char le s R . Burns 
Graduate Student 
Department of Political Science 
Eastern Illinois University 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS SURVEY 
EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY 
SUMMER 1971 
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INSTRUCTIONS TO INTERVIEWERS 
1. Your directions on the questionnaire a re enclosed in boxes. During 
. an interview read the entire questionnaire word for word, except 
those directions enclosed in boxes. 
2. Read the statements slowly and clearly. I£ the respondent does not 
understand a statement or some instruction, reread the statement 
or instruction without changing a word. 
3. Be certain that the cards us.ed by the respondent are returned to 
you immediately. 
4. Get a response for each question and fill in each blank on the answer 
sheet with a pen. 
S. Mark each block plainly; write the occupation and academic disci-
pline response legibly. 
6. Don't forget to enter the case number and your number on the answer 
sheet. 
7. If you have any problems; in the event that anyone questions your 
credentials, call the Political Science Department. 
8. Smile. 
90 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS QUESTIONNAIRE 
EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY 
SUMMER 1971 
INTRODUCTION: HELLO ..• I'M AN INTERVIEWER FROM EASTERN 
ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY. THEY'RE DOING A STUDY 
OF SOME OF THE OPINIONS THAT PEOPLE HAVE 
ABOUT INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. 
THE FOLLOWING ARE STATEMENTS WITH WHICH 
SOME PEOPLE AGREE AND OTHERS DISAGREE. 
PLEASE TELL ME THE AMOUN·T OF YOUR AGREE -
MENT OR DISAGREEMENT WITH EACH ONE AFTER 
HAND CARD: I READ IT, BY USING THIS CARD. 
I. We need more leaders who have the morals and strength to put na-
tional honor above appeasement. 
2. If it weren't for Russia and her satellites, the world would be headed 
for peace and prosperity by now. 
*3. In the long run, it would be to our be st interest as a nation to spend 
less money for military purposes and more money for education, 
housing and other social improvements. 
4. The immigration of foreigners to this country should be kept down 
so that we can provide for Americans first. 
5. The only way peace can be maintained is to keep America so power-
ful and well armed that no other nation will dare attack us. 
*6. Our best policy in Viet Nam would be to forget about the Saigon govern-
ment and work for an agreement with the Communists. 
7. If the United Nations doesn't show more signs of getting rough with 
Russia soon, America must be prepared to carry on the fight by itself. 
8. While we should give military aid to countries which are prepared to 
fight our enemies, we ought to cut down on foreign economic help, or 
else the other countries will just play us for a sucker. 
9. In these troubled times, if we are to be strong and united against 
our common enemy, we must have more laws and safeguards against 
the spreading of dangerous ideas. 
*10. One main trouble with American foreign policy today is that there is 
too much concern with military force and too little concern with poli-
tical negotiation and economic reconstruction. 
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11. In view of America's material and moral superiority, it is only right 
tha,t,we should have the biggest say in deciding United Nations policy. 
*12. The first principle of our foreign policy should be to join forces 
with any country even if it is not very democratic, just as long as it 
is strongly anti-Communist. 
TAKE CARD BACK: 
THE PURPOSE OF THE NEXT GROUP OF QUESTIONS IS TO MEA-
SURE DIFFER ENC ES IN OPINIONS RELATING TO PEA CE AND WAR. 
THE STATEMENTS EXPRESS VARIOUS DEGREES OF OPINION ABOUT 
MILITARISM-PACIFISM. 
AFTER I READ EACH STATEMENT, TELL IF, ON THE WHOLE 
YOU AGREE WITH THE STATEMENT, OR IF, ON THE WHOLE YOU 
DISAGREE WITH THE SENTIMENT OF THE STATEMENT. PLEASE 
RESPOND TO EACH STATEMENT EVEN IF IT SEEMS AMBIGUOUS 
AND YOU HAVE TO MAKE SOME SORT OF GUESS. 
MARK A PLUS SIGN ON THE ANSWER' SHEET FOR AGREEMENT, AND 
A MINUS SIGN TO INDICATE DISAGREEMENT. 
13. Multitudes are benefited by learning the lesson of wartime discipline. 
14. Army discipline injures self-respect and individuality. 
15. It is the moral duty of the individual to refuse to participate in any 
war, no matter what the cause. 
16. For the liberty of oppressed nations wa~s should be fought. 
l 7. It is impossible to have a large military force without being tempted 
to use it. 
18. So long as any people, white, black, brown or yellow hold weapons 
in their hands, we must not commit the folly:of ·disarrning. 
19. No scheme of aggression or conquest can be pursued for any consider-
able length of time without enfeebling victor as well as vanquished •. 
20. There is no progress without war. 
21. If armed conflict between individuals and cities can be outlawed, it 
is possible to outlaw armed conflict between nations. 
2.2.. Military training is imperative, but it should be voluntary. 
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23. A host of young men entered the war in a spirit of idealism and un-
selfish devotion to a great cause, only to return disillusioned and 
cynical as to the value of ideals. 
24. Peace and war are both essential to progress. 
THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS CAN BE COMPLETED BY ONE 
OF FOUR CHOICES THAT WILL BE READ AFTER EACH STATEMENT. 
CHOOSE THE ONE THAT YOU THINK IS MOST CORRECT FOR EACH 
STATEMENT, IF YOU HAVEN'T HAD TIME TO READ ABOUT OR HAVEN'T 
HEARD ABOUT ONE OF THE STATEMENTS MAKE SOME SORT OF GUESS. 
2S. The name of the current Secretary-General of the United Nations 
is: A. Arthur Goldberg; B. David K. Bruce; C. U Thant; D. 
William J. Fullbright. 
26. The following country is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO): A. The United Kingdom; B. France; C. 
Sweden; D. The United States. 
2 7. The Warsaw Pact might be considered the East European equivalent 
to: A. SEATO; B. NATO; C. The UN; D. EEC. 
28. A recent move by President Nixon to improve United States' relations 
with Red China has been: A. Breaking diplomatic relations with Nation-
alist China; B. Sending foreign aid to mainland China; C. Easing 
some trade restrictions with mainland China; D. Sending an official 
delegation to both mainland and Nationalist China. 
29. The principal participants in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
(SALT) a·re: A. The United States and France; B. France and The 
Soviet Union; C. Germany and The Soviet Union; D. The United 
States and The Soviet Union. 
30. One of the main goals of United States foreign policy in the Middle 
East has been: A. The return of the Golan Heights; B. Con.fron-
tation with the Soviet Union whenever possible; C. Increasing the 
stability of the current cease-fire situation; D. Opening of the 
Suez Canal under Israeli supervision. 
31. The Alliance For Progress was the framework for a United States 
foreign policy directed at countries in: A. South America; B. Africa; 
C. Eastern Europe; D. Southeast Asia. 
32. According to the "Domino Theory" of international relations, allowing 
one country in Southeast Asia to become controlled by the Communists 
would result in: A. Worldwide Communist takeover; B. Other 
countrie,s thinking that the United States is weak; · C. Economic ruin. 
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of the neighboring countries; D. Communist takeover in the n~h-
~oring countries. 
33. One of the main obstacles to nuclear disarmament is: A. France's 
refusal to sign the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; B. Failure to agree 
on the terms of inspecti~; C. Continued underground nuclear test-
ing by the Soviet Union; D. Repeated nuclear threats by Red China. 
34. The chief delegate to the Paris Peace talks for the Provisional Revo-
lutionary Government (PRG) is: A. Le Dud Tho; B. Nguyen Cao Ky; 
C. Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh; D. General Khan. 
35. The General Assembly of the United Nations can act on a issue when 
the Security Council is dead locked in a veto under the provisions of: 
A. The Grand Alliance; B. The Essentials of Peace Resolution; C. 
The Uniting for Peace Resolution; D. The Troika Plan. 
36. The five nation Andean Pact is designed to: A. Limit foreign invest-
ment in South America; B. Provide for the common defense of South 
American countries on both sides of the Andes; C. Establish a sort 
of Common Market in South America; D. Impose economic hardships 
on the United States by means of a limited boycott. 
IN ORDER TO COMPLETE THIS STUDY, SOME INFORMATION ABOUT 
YOU IS NECESSARY. PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS 
AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE. 
37. Do you consider yourself: A. Very interested in foreign affairs; B. 
Moderately interested; C. Interested, but not informed; D. Not at 
all interested? 
38. Do you read newspapers regularly? 
39. Do you listen to the news on the radio or television regularly? 
40. Do you consider yourself a native of Illinois? 
41. About how many professional organizations do you belong to? 
42. A bout how many civic organizations do you belong to? 
43·~ About how many fraternal organizations do you belong to? 
44. What is your primary occupation:? 
OBTAIN A DEFINITE ANSWER •. IF RESPONDENT IS A TEACHER, CON-
TINUE WITH QUESTION #45; IF NOT, PROCEED TO QUESTION #46. . .. 
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45. What is your academic discipline? 
46. HAND RESPONDENT CARD #Z: Looking at this card just give me the 
letter of the group which describes how much school you have completed. 
IF RESPONSE IS "D" THRU "G" ASK QUESTION #47; IF NOT, PROCEED. 
TO QUESTION #48. 
47. About how many courses did you have in the social sciences? 
48. In politics do you consider yourself a Democrat or a Republican, or 
a member of some other party? 
IF RESPONS~ IS "INDEPENDENT", ASK QUESTION #49; IF NOT, PROCEED 
TO QUESTION #50. 
49. Would you say that you lean more toward the Republican side or toward 
the Democratic side? 
IF RESPONSE IS STILL "INDEPENDENT", RECORD IT AS SUCH. 
50. What is your age in years?· IF NO RESPONSE, ENTER AN ESTIMATE. 
51. What is your marital status? 
52. ENTER WHETHER RESPONDENT IS MALE OR FEMALE. 
53. ENTER CASE NUMBER. 
54. ENTER INTERVIEWER NUMBER. 
55. IS RESPONDENT: A. A MEMBER OF EIU FACULTY; <B. COUNTY 
OFFICIAL? 
56. IF RESPONDENT IS A COUNTY OFFICIAL ASK: How many years 
have you been an elected county official? · · 
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TELL THE INTERVIEWER THE AMOUNT OF YOUR AGREEMENT OR 
DISAGREEMENT WITH EACH STATEMENT THAT HE READS BY CHOOS-
ING THE NUMBER OPPOSITE THE PHRASE THAT BEST EXPRESSES 
YOUR OPINION: 
+I: Slightly support, agreement · 
+2: Moderate support, agreement 
+3: Strong support, agreement 
-1: Slight opposition, disagree 
-2: Moderate opposition, disagree. 
-3: Strong opposition, disagree 
PLEASE RETURN THIS CARD TO THE INTERVIEWER 
TELL THE INTERVIEWER THE LETTER OF THE GROUP WHICH DE-
SCRIBES HOW MUCH SCHOOL YOU HAVE COMPLETED: 
A. 0-8 years 
B. Some High School 
c. Completed High School 
D. Some College 
E. Completed College 
F. Graduate Degree (MA Level) 
G. Graduate Degree (Ph.D. Level) 
PLEASE RETURN THIS CARD.: TO THE INTERVIEWER 
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CHOOSE THE ANSWER THAT YOU THINK BEST COMPLETES THE 
STATEMENT THAT IS READ BY THE INTERVIEWER: 
2. 5. A. Arthur Goldberg; B. David K. Bruce; C. U Thant; D. William 
J. Fullbright. 
2.6. A. The United Kingdom; B. France; C. Sweden; D. The United 
States. 
2.7. A. SEATO; B. NATO; C. T,he UN; D. EEC. 
2.8. A. Breaking diplomatic relations with Nationalist China; B. Sending 
foreign aid to mainland China; C. Easing some trade restrictions 
with mainland China; D. Sending an official delegation to both main-
land and Nationalist China. 
2.9. A. The United States and France; B. France and the Soviet Union; 
C. Germany and the Soviet Union; D. The United States and the Soviet 
Union. 
30. A. The return of the Golan Heights; B. Confrontation with the Soviet 
Union whenever possible; C. Increasing the stability of the current 
cease-fire .situation; D. Opening of the Suez Canal under Israeli 
supervision. 
31. A. South America; B. Africa; C. Eastern Europe; D. Southeast 
Asia. 
32.. A. Worldwide Communist takeover; B. Other countries thinking 
that the United States is weak; C. Economic ruin of the neighboring 
countries; D. Communist takeover in the neighboring countries. 
33. A. France's refusal to sign the Nuclear. Test Ban Treaty; B. Failure 
to agree on the terms of inspections; C. Continued underground· 
nuclear testing by the Soviet Union; D. Repeated nuclear threats by 
Red China. 
34. A. Le.·nuc Tho; B. Nguyen Cao Ky; C. Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh; 
D. General Khan. 
35. A. The Grand Alliance; B. The Essentials of Peace Resolution; C. · 
The Uniting for Peace Resolution; D. The Troika Plan. 
36. A. Limit foreigq. investment in South America; B. Provide for the 
common defense of South American countries on both sides of the 
Andes; C. Establish a sort of Common Market in South America; 
D. Impose economic hardships on the United States by means of a 
limited boycott. 
PLEASE RETURN THIS LIS'Il.TO THE INTERVIEWER 
+3 -t2. +l NR -1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
+ - NR 
13 5 
14 15 
15 21 
16 6 
17 13 
18 4 
19 13 
20 0 
21 14 52 M 
22 7 53 
23 15 54 
2.4 9 55 A 
56 
57 
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ANSWER SHEET 
-2 -3 A 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 A 
38 Yes 
39 Yes 
40 Yes 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
F 46 
47 
48 D-
B' 49 D 
50 
51 $ 
B C D 
B C D 
-No 
No 
·No 
R ;I :NR 
R·. I NR 
M ··o. SP. w NR 
CODE BOOK 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS SURVEY 
SUMMER 1971 
98 
99 
CODING INSTRUCTIONS63 
If quantitative values are of fewer digits than available columns, 
preface values with zeroes to fill all columns. 
Column Numbers 
and Variables 
Cl - C3 
SKIP C4 
CS - C7 
SKIP ca 
C9 - Cll 
SKIP Cl2 
Procedure 
Add scores of numbers 1-12 using the follow-
ing equivalent numbers: 
+3 . +-2 . +l NR -1 -2 -3 
7 6 s: 4 3 2 1 
*l 2 3 4 5 6 7 
*Note: Equivalency scale is reverse for starred 
items. 
Determine the mean value of the total score 
and multiply by ten. 
Enter result in Cl - C3. 
Add equivalent numbers in items 12-24 which 
show a ch~ck in the plus (+) cqlumn. 
Enter result in CS - C7. 
Add five poi.'nts for each correct answer in 
items 25-36. 
Enter total in C9 - Cll. 
63These procedures were developed to transfer the data to com-
puter punch cards. 
The procedures outlined were considerably simplified in actual 
field work by the use of a relatively simple scoring key which fitted over 
the answer sheet. 
100 
CODING INSTRUCTIONS (Continued) 
Column Numbers 
and Variables 
cn· 
Cl4, Cl5, Cl6 . 
Cl7 
SKIP Cl8 
Cl9 - 21 
SKIP C22 
C23 
Academic Discipline 
C24 
Level of Education 
C25 
Courses in Social 
Sciences 
SKIP C26 
C27 
Party Affiliation 
SKIP C28 
C29 - 31 
Age. 
Procedure 
Enter checked value: 
A = l; B • 2; C • 3; D • 4. 
Enter '·'l" £or Yes; "2" for No in C14, Cl5, 
Cl6 respectively. 
Add values of items 41 - 43 and enter result 
in Cl 7. 
Note: If value is greater than "9", enter "9" 
in Cl 7. 
Consult occupation equivalencies and enter 
equivalent numbers in Cl9 - CZl. 
Consult any discipline equivalencies and enter 
equivalent number in C23. 
Convert value in Item 46 by consulting Level 
of Education Equivalencies and enter equiva-
lent number in C24. 
Enter value in item 47 in CZS. 
If value.is greater than "9", enter "9". 
If blank, enter 11 0 11 • 
For items 48 - 49, enter the following value 
in CZ7: D ... l; R • 2; I• 3; NR • 4. 
Enter value of Item 50 in C2.9 - 31. 
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CODING INSTRUCTIONS (Continued) 
Column Numbers 
and Variables 
SKIP C32. 
C33 
Marital Status 
C34 
Sex 
SKIP C35 
C36. - C38'· 
ca·se· Numbe,r· :· · 
SKIP C39 
C40 - C42. 
Interviewer Number 
SKIP C43 
C44 
Faculty or County 
Officia 1 Group 
SKIP G4S 
C46 - G4S 
Years of Teaching 
Experience 
SKIP C49 
cso - csz 
Years in Public Office 
Procedure 
For item 51 enter the following values in C33: 
S = 1; M • 2.; D = 3; Sp = 4; W • 5; NR • 6. 
For item 52. enter the following value in C34: 
M = l; F = Z. . 
' For item 53 enter value in C36 - C38. 
For itemr54 '.ente~~value in C40 - C4Z. 
For item 55 enter the following values: 
A = l; B = 2.. 
For item 56 enter appearing values 
If less than one year, enter "001". 
For any part of a year, enter next highest year. 
If blank, enter· "000" in C46 - C48. 
For item 57 enter appearing values. 
If less than one year, enter ''001". 
For ,any part of a year, enter •mo 1". 
If blank, enter "000" in CSO - CSZ. 
Column Numbers 
and Variables 
C54 - C58 
1oz 
CODING INSTRUCTIONS (Continued) 
Procedure 
Enter "08071" (Date and Project Code) in 
C54 - C58 for all cards. 
Equivalency 
001 
002 
003 
004 
005 
006 
007 
008 
009 
010 
011 
012 
013 
014 
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OCCUPATION EQUIVALENCIES64 CI9 - CZI 
Occupation 
Professional and technical. 
Farmers and farm managers. 
Man.agers, officials, and proprietors. 
Clerical workers. 
Sales workers. 
Craftsmen and foremen. 
Operatives. 
Private household workers. 
Service workers. 
Farm laborers and foremen. 
Laborers, except farm and mine. 
Students. 
Housewives. 
Retired, Unemployed, and Widows. 
64 · Adapted from Backstrom and Hursch, Qe_. Cit., pp. 99-101. 
Equivalent 
Number 
1 
z 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
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DISCIPLINE EQUIVALENCIES CZ3 
Academic Discipline 
College of Letters and Science. 
Political Science; Sociology and Anthropology; 
History; Economics; Physiology; Botany; Zoology; 
Life Sciet1.ce; Physics; Chemistry; Geology and 
Geography; Mathematics; Philosophy; Art; Theatre 
Arts; Speech; Languages and Literature. 
Faculty of Education 
School of Business. 
Accounting; Business Education and Secretarial 
Studies; Management; Marketing; Graduate School 
of Business. 
School of Health, Physical Education and Recreation 
School of Home Economics 
School of Industrial Arts and Technology 
School of Music 
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LEVEL OF EDUCATION EQUIVALENCIES C24 
Equivalent Answer Sheet Level of Education 
Number Response 
1 A 0 - 8 years 
2 B Some High School 
3 C Completed High School 
4 D Some College 
5 E Completed College 
6 F Graduate Degree (MA level) 
7 G Graduate Degree (Ph.D. level) 
APPENDIX B 
TABLE 23 
Quantitative Characteristics of Elite Groups 
And Aggregate Sample 
Mean S.D. S. E. Range 
~regate 
Nationalism-Internationalism 9.9 10.9 1..2 45 
Militarism-Pacific ism 55.3 20.5 2.3 90 
Information Level 40.8 45.3 5. 1 30 
Organization Membership 4.6 3.3 .4 9 
Age 47. 1 12.3 1.4 75 
Social Science Background 3.8 3.6 .4 9 
Faculty 
Nationalism-Internationalism 34.2 10.0 1. 6 45 
Militarism-Pacific ism 56.0 Z0.5 3.Z 90 
Information Level 40.4 8.4 1.· 3 35 
Organization Membership 5.9 2.9 • 5 9 
Age 42.6 12.4 z.o 62 
Social Science Background 6.5 Z.7 .4 9 
Experience 11. 5 8.0 1. 3 30 
County Officials 
· Nationalism-Internationali"sm .45. 5 8.6 1.4 37 
Militarism-Pacific ism 54.7 20. 8 3.3 84 
Information Level 41. Z · 63.9 10.1 70 
Organization Membership 3.3 3.0 • 5 9 
Age 1. z z.z .4 9 
Social Science Background 51. 6 10.6 1.7 42 
Experience .11. 8 Z0.3 3.Z ZS 
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Figure 7 
Attitudinal Distribution of Faculty Over 
Nationalism-Internationalism and 
Militarism-Pacificism Scales 
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Figure 8 
Attitudinal Distribution of County Officials 
Over Nationalism-Internationalism and 
Militarism-Pacificism Scales 
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